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FOREVER TORN ASUNDER: CHARTING
EVIDENTIARY PARAMETERS, THE RIGHT TO
COMPETENT COUNSEL AND THE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CALIFORNIA
CHILD DEPENDENCY AND PARENTAL SEVERANCE
CASES
William Wesley Patton*
I. INTRODUCTION
The California child welfare dependency system is in the throes
of a dilemma. Between 1980 and 1985, the number of child abuse
petitions filed in Los Angeles County doubled.' In response to the
Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980,2 Cali-
fornia streamlined its dependency system to provide expedited deter-
mination of whether families temporarily separated, based upon
findings of abuse or neglect, can be reunited.' California Senate Bill
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1. In 1985, 17,913 child abuse or neglect petitions were filed with the Department of
Public Social Services Department of Children's Services (D.P.S.S./D.C.S.) in Los Angeles
County alone. In contrast, in 1980 only 8,192 cases were filed, representing over a 100%
increase in filings between 1980 and 1985 in Los Angeles County. Letter from Diana R.
Bichler, Director of Juvenile Court Services, to William Patton (July 7, 1986) (on file in the
Whittier College School of Law (WCSL) Library). In 1963 there were only 150,000 reports
of child abuse nationally. In 1971 the number of reports jumped to 610,000, and in 1981 they
escalated to 1.3 million. However, "up to 65 percent of all reports are now determined to have
been made inappropriately." Besharov, Deliverance: The Duty to Report Child Abuse, L.A.
Daily J., Sept. 4, 1986, § I, at 4, col. 5 (Douglas J. Besharov was Director of the U.S.
National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect from 1975-1979).
2. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500, 42 U.S.C. § 670 (1980).
3. In 1980, Congress passed the Act (Pub. L. No. 96-272) to reduce local government's
reliance on long-term placement of children and to spur "speedy reunification of families
whenever possible or advisable." The Children's Budget of Los Angeles County Government:
The L.A. Roundtable for Children, 1986, at 115 [hereinafter Roundtable, 1986]; Profile of
the Children of L.A. County, The L.A. Roundtable for Children, 1984, at 43 [hereinafter
Roundtable, 1984].
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14 cut in half the time period within which courts determine
whether families could be reunited or whether children should be
permanently placed outside the home. The expedited determination
would be made possible by providing increased funds to help families
quickly resolve their problems and become reunited." However, Cali-
fornia implemented only half of its objective. Although families now
have one year, instead of two years, to resolve their problems, the
State did not provide increased funding or resources to assist family
reunification.5
Expedited judicial decisions concerning the future of families
are severely impeded by "a state of chronic system overload." ' In
1985, Los Angeles County alone received approximately 5,500 re-
ports of suspected child abuse or neglect per month. Of these reports,
about 1,200 cases per month were serious enough to require court
proceedings.7 Between 1979 and 1983 the number of child abuse and
neglect referrals rose by 46% and the number of dependent children
under court supervision rose by 62%.8 Child dependency funding be-
tween fiscal years 1980-81 and 1984-85 rose only 24%, while refer-
rals accepted by the Department of Children's Services rose 37% and
dependency investigations rose 120%. Further, the budget for depen-
dency courts rose 65% while the number of cases rose by 100%.' The
4. Instead of continuing the two-year period for family reunification, S.B. 14 provided a
one-year period. California Welfare and Institutions Code section 361(0(1) now provides that,
"the juvenile court shall order the probation officer to provide child welfare services to the
minor and the minor's parents or guardians for the purpose of facilitating reunification of the
family within a maximum time period not to exceed 12 months." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 361(f)(1) (West 1984). Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.25(a) requires the court
within 12 months after the original detention hearing to determine whether the reunification
plan will permit return of the child to his family or whether a Civil Code section 232 parental
severance trial to free the child for adoption should be pursued. Id. at § 366.25(a).
5. ID]etailed examination of the budget reveals the virtual absence of funding for
one crucial area, namely specific in home services aimed at enabling at-risk chil-
dren to remain in - or be returned to - their own families but under safe
conditions. These services were mandated by State legislation, but the State
failed to provide adequate funding to implement them.
Roundtable, 1986, supra note 3, at 15. In In re James B., 184 Cal. App. 3d 524, 229 Cal.
Rptr. 206 (1986), there was a delay of several months between recommended child counseling
and therapy because of "a shortage of qualified counselors" and "the lack of sufficient staff at
Mental Health Services." Id. at 528-29, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 207-08.
6. Roundtable, 1986, supra note 3, at 142.
7. Id. at 112; Children's Services Rx: More Money, Fewer Cases, The Daily Breeze,
Mar. 23, 1986, at A3, col. I [hereinafter Children's Services]; Child Abuse a Growing Trag-
edy in L.A. County, L.A. Times, Aug. 21, 1983, at 1, col. 2 [hereinafter Growing Tragedy].
8. Roundtable, 1984, supra note 3, at 45.
9. Roundtable, 1986, supra note 3, at 15, 119. The dramatic increase in child abuse
and neglect cases is illustrated in the following table:
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juvenile dependency courts' case loads are unmanageable; each Los
Angeles County dependency judge hears five to ten new cases and as
many as 25 reviews a day of cases already under court jurisdiction.1
The budget constraints and increase in child dependency cases
have infected the probation officers' reports, the single most influen-
tial data used to determine whether abuse or neglect occurred and
whether temporary separation or permanent severance of parental
ties is necessary." In Los Angeles County, each social worker han-
dles between 60 and 100 active cases, the highest caseload in the
nation.' Grand juries across California have recently reported that
probation officers lack the training, education and skills required to
work with abused or neglected children.' The combination of high
case loads and minimal expertise have forced some probation officers
to violate statutorily mandated procedures to ensure that court inter-
vention into family life is necessary; required probation officer family
services are frequently not given.' 4 Further, the probation reports
1975 1979 1983
Referrals 19,678 27,212 38,700
Dependency
Petitions Filed 3,291 6,147 9,449
Average Number
of children supervised
by the court each month 7,296 11,325 18,385
In fiscal year 1984-85, there were 39,216 case referrals to D.P.S.S. and 21,722 dependent
children under court supervision. Roundtable, 1986, supra note 3, at 119. The number ofWelfare and Institutions Code section 300 filings in Los Angeles County rose from 8,192 in
1980 to 17,913 in 1985. Letter from Diana R. Bickler, supra note 1.
10. Growing Tragedy, supra note 7, at 33, col. 2.
11. The term "probation officer" will be used generically for county workers mandatedto investigate and prepare reports in child dependency cases. That term includes probation
officers, social workers, case workers, adoption workers, etc. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§§ 280, 358, 361(0(1), 362(d) (West 1984 & Supp. 1987); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 232, 233(West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
12. Children's Services, supra note 7, at A3, col. 5. On September 7, 1985, a union
representing 1,600 Los Angeles County probation officers threatened to walk off their jobsbecause of the high caseloads and low salary; however, the strike was averted. L.A. Times,
Sept. 24, 1985, § I, at 6, col. 2.
13. Grand Juries Indict Protective Services System, L.A. Daily J., Aug. 21, 1986, at 20,
col. 2 [hereinafter Grand Juries].
14. Jane Henderson, a consultant to the state Senate Select Committee on Children andYouth, stated that "system overload has fostered 'widespread disregard of current rules' by
social workers who cannot possibly perform to standards and still service all their cases." InChild-Abuse Cases, Kids Sometimes Become Victims at the Hands of Their Guardians, L.A.Daily J., Aug. 21, 1986, at 20, col. 4. Further, Stanford Professor Michael Wald, who helped
write much of the California dependency scheme, stated "[o]ur current model assumes compe-tence, when in fact there's a lot of incompetence. It assumes trained people, when there are
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are becoming less reliable and are often incomplete.' 5 In a recent
case, the court concluded that there was "strong evidence the county
welfare department did not provide or offer [required] services to
. , [the mother] . . . designed to overcome the problems which led
to the loss of custody of her children."' Another case noted "a de-
partment 'mind set' to place appellant's children for foster parent
adoption as soon as possible" even though placement with relatives
was a more feasible remedy which the department failed to timely
explore.17
Both the number of child abuse and neglect cases and public
outcry have dramatically increased. Infamous cases such as the al-
leged McMartin pre-school sex abuse scandal have inflamed citizens'
cries for tougher laws and more certain means of protecting chil-
dren. 8 The focus in both criminal and child dependency trials is
quickly shifting from the parents' due process rights to procedural
and logistic protections for children thrust into the judicial system. 9
In dependency cases, parents can even be excluded during their
child's testimony taken in the trial court's chambers, thus radically
altering traditional notions of cross-examination and confrontation.20
Adding to the increased possibilities of unreliablility in dependency
cases is the United States Supreme Court's holding that parents do
not have an automatic due process right to have a court-appointed
untrained people. It assumes adequate resources, when there are inadequate resources." Id. In
a recent report California State Attorney General John Van de Kamp stated that most Kern
County Sheriff "deputies had little or no training in investigating child sexual abuse cases, and
those assigned [to a recent investigation] did not receive the additional specialized training
required by law." L.A. Times, Sept. 30, 1986, § I, at 3, col. 3.
15. It is not surprising that, as the number of cases increases and the amount of investi-
gative time per case decreases, the margin for error increases. A similar result is occurring in
the California criminal law system. Superior Court Judge Gordon Ringer lamented the "in-
complete" probation reports upon which he must rely. L.A. Times, Sept. 10, 1984, § II, at 1,
col. 4. Probation officers in the California criminal justice system "[clomplain that they rarely
have time . . . to talk more than briefly with the defendant, the victim and the investigating
officer and to peruse the district attorney's file. Some say they rarely leave their offices more
than to visit a defendant in jail because they don't have time." Id.
16. In re Jose F., 178 Cal. App. 3d 1116, 1126, 224 Cal. Rptr. 239, 244 (1986).
17. In re Terry E., 180 Cal. App. 3d 932, 947, 225 Cal. Rptr. 803, 818 (1986).
18. In March, 1984, the Los Angeles County Grand Jury returned indictments against
the owner and several teachers at the Virginia McMartin Pre-school in Manhattan Beach,
California. Pre-school Safety Task Force Final Report, Attachment A at 57 (1984) (Remarks
by Ronald Summit, M.D.).
19. There has been a 238% increase from 1980 to 1984 in the number of criminal cases
involving abuse of children in Los Angeles County. In 1980, the Los Angeles District Attorney
Child Abuse and Domestic Violence Unit had 973 cases, while in 1984 the number of cases
rose to 3,290. Roundtable, 1986, supra note 3, at 132.
20. In re Stanley F., 86 Cal. App. 3d 568, 152 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1978).
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attorney. 2' Therefore, many dependency trials are the result of legal
ignorance; there are few objections to inadmissible evidence, relevant
evidence is not marshalled in the parents' behalf, parental fact inves-
tigation is often non-existent, and the state's burden is necessarily
lessened in the so-called informal, non-adversarial interviews, media-
tions, negotiations and hearings.
In light of the increasingly inaccurate and overburdened child
dependency system, this article will analyze three troubling issues: 1)
whether parents have a right to competent representation when the
state proceeding may result in a temporary or permanent loss of
their child; 2) what burden of proof regarding the competence of
counsel is applicable; and 3) how parents' fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination affects simultaneous child dependency and
criminal proceedings which are based upon the same allegations of
child abuse or neglect. The article finally considers whether the cur-
rent statutory scheme provides adequate protection against the trial
court's consideration of irrelevant and highly prejudicial data which
is contained in probation reports.2"
II. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CALIFORNIA WELFARE AND
INSTITUTION CODE SECTION 300 DEPENDENCY CASES
Indigent parents do not have a statutory right to court-ap-
pointed counsel in dependency cases.2" However, courts have discre-
tion to appoint counsel for indigent parents2 4 and in practice counsel
is frequently appointed.26 But there is no automatic state or federal
21. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18, reh'g denied, 453 U.S. 927 (1981).
22. The demographics of children living in Los Angeles County are staggering. The
1980 census listed over two million children under 18 years of age, with 61% being non-white.
Therefore, "one of every thirty children in the United States" lives in Los Angeles County.
This article's focus on the Los Angeles County dependency system sheds some light on the
types of services and legal procedures provided to one of the most ethnically diverse popula-
tions in the United States. Roundtable, 1984, supra note 3, at 1. Although many of this
article's conclusions are based upon Los Angeles County statistics, similar problems are being
faced in every California county. See Grand Juries, supra note 13.
23. In re Joseph T., 25 Cal. App. 3d 120, 125-31, 101 Cal. Rptr. 606, 610-14 (1972).
In limited demonstration areas, parents had an absolute right to counsel pursuant to Welfare
and Institutions Code section 318.5(b) which provided in pertinent part that "the court shall
appoint counsel . . . for the parents or guardian when it appears to the court that the parents
or guardian desire counsel but are unable to afford and cannot for that reason employ coun-
sel." CAL. W.LF. & INST. CODE § 318.5(b) (West 1984). That section was repealed effective
October 1, 1984.
24. "[W]hen it appears to the court that the minor or his parent or guardian desires
counsel but is unable to afford and cannot for that reason employ counsel, the court may
appoint counsel." CAL.. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317 (West 1984).
25. In In re Brian B., 141 Cal. App. 3d 397, 190 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1983), the court
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constitutional due process right to counsel.28
A. Parental Right to Counsel under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses
The California Supreme Court in Salas v. Cortez27 held that
the due process clause guaranteed a right of counsel to indigent de-
fendants in paternity actions initiated by the district attorney on be-
half of an unwed mother.28 Salas noted that paternity actions involve
more than monetary judgments; they involve the fundamental right
of parenthood. Paternity actions differ from ordinary civil actions be-
cause: "in these cases the full power of the state is pitted against an
indigent person. . . . Thus, appellant's entitlement to counsel turns
on whether the state has a compelling interest that would justify its
insistence on denying appellants a fair opportunity to defend."29
Salas noted that the court's determination that the defendant is the
father in a paternity action may profoundly affect several persons'
lives. "It may disrupt an established family and damage reputa-
tions."' Further, Salas stated that failure to provide child support
may result in criminal prosecution where the question of paternity
has been decided in a civil proceeding in which the defendant was
unrepresented by counsel."1
Indigent parents involved in dependency cases face the same
problems and potential liabilities as indigent paternity defendants.
Both types of cases involve the fundamental right of parenting.32
Each case involves indigent parents who are forced to defend against
the tremendous resources of governmental prosecution. Dependency
judgments profoundly impact parents, disrupt families, and damage
parents' reputations.
stated in dictum that parents in severance cases "are entitled to counsel. ... Id. at 398, 190
Cal. Rptr. at 154. Although technically inaccurate, in practice, request for counsel is seldom
denied. However, the custom of appointing counsel is clearly not the equivalent of a right to
counsel. Custom can easily give way under the pressure of budgetary constraints.
26. In Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981), the Court held that
even in a more serious case of parental severance, such as a case involving California Civil
Code section 232, the right to appointed counsel is a decision based on a case-by-case analysis
since the fundamental right jeopardized was not the parents' own liberty. But see Keelson v.
City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 655 (9th Cir. 1985).
27. 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1979).
28. Id. at 27, 593 P.2d at 229-30, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 532-33.
29. Id. at 32, 593 P.2d at 233, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
30. Id. at 28, 593 P.2d at 230, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
31. Id. at 29, 593 P.2d at 231, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
32. Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); In re Carmaleta B., 21 Cal. 3d 482, 489,
579 P.2d 514, 518, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623, 627 (1978).
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There is an intimate connection between dependency cases and
pending or future criminal charges based upon the same alleged
facts."3 The dependency allegations lighten the prosecution's burden
of proof in the criminal case, because the prosecutor may represent
the state in both the dependency and criminal trials. 4 Since the par-
ents do not have a right to Miranda admonitions during the proba-
tion officer's initial investigation of the dependency case, they are notinformed of their fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion."5 Any pre-trial admissions or confessions are admissible not
only at the dependency trial, but also at the criminal trial.36 Al-
though parents have a privilege against self-incrimination in the de-
pendency trial, several sections create presumptions of abuse or neg-
lect which shift the burden to the parents to rebut those
presumptions.3" Consequently, parents must waive their privilege
33. California Penal Code section 11166, one of the recent child abuse reporting laws,requires the county probation or welfare department to report to the district attorney every
"known or suspected instance of child abuse" as defined in the Penal Code. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 11166 (West 1982). Further, there has been a 238% increase from 1980 to 1984 in thenumber of criminal filings for child abuse or neglect in Los Angeles County. Roundtable,
1986, supra note 3, at 132. Criminal prosecution for child abuse is no longer a remote possi-
bility, it is probable.
34. Welfare and Institutions Code section 351 provides that "the district attorney shall,
with the consent or at the request of the juvenile court judge, appear and participate in thehearing to assist in the ascertaining and presenting of the evidence." CAL. WELF. & INST.CODE § 351 (West 1984). In People v. Superior Court (Martin), 98 Cal. App. 3d 515, 521,
159 Cal. Rptr. 625, 629 (1979), the court stated:
In enacting California Welfare and Institutions Code sections 351 and 681 call-ing for the juvenile court's appointment of the district attorney for a minor
when its parent is "charged in a pending criminal prosecution based upon un-
lawful acts committed against the minor," it was palpably aware that the samedistrict attorney would ordinarily, if not always be simultaneously prosecuting
the parent.
Id. See also Kain v. Municipal Court, 130 Cal. App. 3d 499, 502-03, 181 Cal. Rptr. 751, 753(1982).
35. It is almost certain that parents will try to explain their case to the probation officer
since the interview normally takes place after the child has been taken into protective custody.
Most parents, distraught at the temporary forced severance of parental ties will do whatever is
available to get their child back.
36. Welfare and Institutions Code section 355 is titled, "Description of minor; reception
of evidence; extrajudicial admissions or confessions; objections to evidence" (emphasis added).Section 355 states that the court may consider "any matter or information relevant and mate-
rial" to the allegations. Further, in In re Amos L., 124 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 1039, 177 Cal.Rptr. 783, 787 (1981), the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by com-pelling the mother to testify in the dependency trial without informing her of her privilege
against self-incrimination since Welfare and Institutions Code section 355.7 provides use im-
munity from the testimony being admitted in any other proceeding. However, section 355.7
applies only to testimony during the dependency trial; it has no affect on pre-trial statementsintroduced at criminal or other subsequent trials. Id. See section II, infra.
37. Welfare and Institutions Code sections 355.1-355.4 create presumptions of abuse or
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against self-incrimination in order to rebut the presumptions. Thus,
the prosecution acquires evidence for the criminal trial which would
not otherwise be available through pre-trial criminal discovery.
8
The dependency trial not only directly weakens the parents'
privilege against self-incrimination, but impacts parental rights after
the dependency trial as well. If a dependency petition is sustained,
the court at the dispositional hearing can order the probation officer
to initiate a plan for family reunification which requires parental
participation. 9 The parents' participation in the reunification plan
is considered in periodic reports and reviews, to determine whether
reunification is likely or whether permanent parental severance pro-
ceedings pursuant to California Civil Code section 232 should be
initiated.4 0 The periodic reports contain statements made by parents
participating in court ordered therapy and parent training classes.
Those statements may be introduced by the prosecution in the crimi-
nal trial.
Another similarity between indigent civil litigants in paternity
actions and indigent parents in dependency trials is the res judicata
effect of a paternity determination. It has long been held that the
juvenile dependency court has "jurisdiction to determine parentage"
when the biological parentage is disputed.4' Such a determination
has res judicata effect in all other proceedings.
4 2
neglect which section 355.6 defines as "presumptions affecting the burden of producing evi-
dence." CAl.. WlFt.F. & INST. CODE §§ 355.1-355.4 (West 1984).
38. The California Supreme Court in Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320,
326, 466 P.2d 673, 677, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133 (1970), held that a criminal defendant does
not have to give the prosecution discovery if it "conceivably might lighten the prosecution's
burden of proving its case in chief." Id.
39. The court "shall order the probation officer to provide child welfare services to the
minor and the minor's parents or guardians for the purpose of facilitating reunification .. "
CAt.. WEs.F. & INST. CODE § 361(e) (West 1984). Welfare and Institutions Code section
362(c) states that the "parents or guardians shall be required to participate in child welfare
services" and section 362(d) gives the court jurisdiction to "direct any and all reasonable orders
to the parents . I. " Id. at § 362(c)-(d).
40. Id. at §§ 365, 366. The supplemental report pursuant to section 366.1(d) shall in-
clude "[wihat actions, if any, have been taken by the parent to correct the problems which
caused the child to be made a court dependent." Id. at § 366.1(d).
41. In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 640, 532 P.2d 123, 125, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475, 477
(1975). Evidence Code section 892 permits the court in civil cases discretion to order blood
tests to determine paternity. If an alleged parent refuses to take the test the court "may resolve
the question of paternity against such party ... " CAL. EVID. CODE § 892 (West 1986).
42. De Weese v. Unick, 102 Cal. App. 3d 100, 104-06, 162 Cal. Rptr. 259, 261-63
(1980); In re Russell, 12 Cal. 3d 229, 233, 524 P.2d 1295, 1297, 115 Cal. Rptr. 511, 513
(1974). There is a two-pronged test to determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies.
First, the court must have subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Second, the same cause of
action must be fully litigated on its merits. Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 810,
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Finally, a finding of abuse or neglect in the dependency trial
may result indirectly in the total severance of parental ties in a sub-
sequent non-dependency trial. California Welfare and Institutions
Code section 304.5 provides that "[tihe records of any juvenile court
proceedings involving a minor who is the subject of a proceeding
pursuant to Section 4600 of the Civil Code may be introduced in
evidence in these proceedings."4 Obviously, a finding of abuse or
neglect by a parent in the dependency case will be strong evidence
regarding the desirability of that parent's continuing contact with the
child. The non-offending parent will have a very strong case against
the dependency offending parent, which may result in a court order
cutting off contact with the child pursuant to California Civil Code
section 4600."'
The preceding discussion demonstrates that indigent parents in
dependency cases are similarly situated with indigent defendants in
paternity actions. Thus, the equal protection clause requires equal
treatment of indigent parents in dependency and paternity cases.
Courts could therefore determine that there is no compelling state
interest in denying counsel to dependency parents and find that
counsel is required.4  However, even if courts find that the two
122 P.2d 892, 894-95 (1944).
In civil cases, the doctrine of res judicata bars parties or persons in privity with
them from relitigating a cause of action finally determined by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction. The collateral estoppel aspect of res judicata bars parties or
their privies from relitigating in a new proceeding on a different cause of action
issues actually determined in a prior proceeding.
In re Russell, 12 Cal. 3d at 233, 524 P.2d at 1297, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
43. CAL. WEt-. & INST. CODE § 304.5 (West 1984). Determinations of child custody of
separated or divorced parents are governed by sections 4600-08. Those trials involve child
support (section 4600.2), permanent and temporary custody (sections 4600 and 4600.1), and
child visitation privileges (sections 4601 and 4607). CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 4600-08
(West Supp. 1987).
44. Although judgments under Civil Code section 4600 are subject to modification, the
longer the parent is excluded contact with the child, the greater the likelihood that the court
will permanently sever parental relations pursuant to Civil Code section 232(a)(1) if the child
has been left "by one parent in the care and custody of the other parent for his support, or
without communication from such . . . parent, with the intent on the part of such parent...
to abandon such person." CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
45. The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no state
shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV. Similarly, under article I, section 7 of the California Constitution, "a person
may not be . . .denied equal protection of the laws." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7. The minimum
requirements of the equal protection clause command that when a state scheme treats persons
who are similarly situated in a different manner, there must be a compelling state interest.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has established that when classification impinges on funda-
mental interests, it will be strictly scrutinized to assure that there has been no violation of the
equal protection clause. Thus, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966),
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groups of defendants are not similarly situated, or that a compelling
state interest exists for treating the two groups differently, the Cali-
fornia due process clause requires appointment of counsel for indi-
gent parents in dependency cases. Each of the due process policies in
Salas v. Cortez applies equally to dependency cases. Parents in de-
pendency cases face more grievous consequences than paternity de-
fendants. There is simply no reason, other than saving money, for
the state to deny parents counsel. Since the best interests of the child
may only be determined upon a full and fair exploration of the facts,
denying parents counsel detrimentally affects the fact finding process.
The government's evidence may appear conclusive when not subject
to the rigors of the adversarial process, but may be very different in
light of defense counsel's evidence, examination and arguments.
B. Dependency Parents' Right to Competent Counsel
Assuming indigent parents in dependency cases have a constitu-
tional right to appointed counsel, they should also have a right to
competent counsel. Even if parents do not have a right to competent
counsel in dependency cases, they should have a right to competent
counsel if the court exercises its discretion by appointing counsel.
Both the United States and California Supreme Courts have de-
clared that the right to effective assistance of counsel is the most ba-
sic extension of the right to counsel .4 The constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel is "among the most sacred and sensi-
tive of our civil rights.'
47
Under the current scheme, a court which exercises discretion by
appointing counsel selects either a public defender or a panel attor-
ney pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions Code section
317. 4' The selection of panel attorneys involves intimate state action.
the Court stated: "we have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties are
asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain
them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined." Id. at 670. For a classification to
withstand strict scrutiny, a state must show that the classification serves a compelling state
interest and that there is no less restrictive means of achieving that purpose. Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
46. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d
987, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963); In re Newbern, 53 Cal. 2d 786, 350 P.2d 116, 3 Cal. Rptr.
364 (1960). In dictum in In re David C., the court noted in a section 232 case that
"[clertainly, as counsel was appointed for the indigent parents in the instant case, the parents
had a right to have effective assistance of counsel." 152 Cal. App. 3d 1189, 1207, 200 Cal.
Rptr. 115, 126 (1984).
47. Magee v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 949, 954, 506 P.2d 1023, 1026, 106 Cal. Rptr.
647, 650 (1973).
48. "In a county where there is no public defender the court may fix the compensation
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In selecting the panel attorneys, the court determines that a particu-
lar attorney is reasonably competent and offers the attorney to the
parents on that basis.49 Compensation for panel attorneys is deter-
mined by the court and is paid out of general county funds. 50 Fur-
thermore, panel attorneys "may be removed from the panel at any
time without the court having to show cause for such removal." 5'
Indigent parents must accept the court's choice of "competent" coun-
sel or proceed in propria persona.5" The court interviews, selects,
certifies, appoints, pays and monitors panel attorneys.
The first case to decide what rights and remedies indigent par-
ents have when their statutorily appointed counsel fails to give com-
petent representation was In re Michael S." That case held that
there is no right to effective assistance of counsel in dependency
cases."' The Michael S. court relied on several cases for the proposi-
tion that dependency cases are ordinary civil cases. 55 But Michael S.
relied most heavily upon the following language from Chevalier v.
Dubin:" "[Wie are aware of no authority, and counsel has cited us
none, which would permit a trial or appellate court to grant a retrial
to an unsuccessful litigant in a civil case, with or without punitive
damages, on the grounds of incompetency of counsel." 5 Thus, the
court in Michael S. declared that a denial of effective assistance of
counsel was not a viable right in dependency cases.
It is critical to note that Chevalier was not a dependency case
to be paid by the county for service of such appointed counsel." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
317 (West 1984). JUVENILE COURT JUDICIAL MANUAL: PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES
[hereinafter J.C.J.M.] section I.B. provides: "[tihe public defender has declared himself un-
available to represent minors or their parents in [Welfare and Institutions Code section] 300
proceedings in Los Angeles County. Accordingly, the court will appoint private counsel from
the Juvenile Court Panel of Appointed Attorneys to represent minors and, where appropriate,
their parents. ... J.C.J.M., supra, at § I.B.
49. In selecting attorneys to serve on juvenile court panels, the Committee Uudi-
cial officers on the Juvenile Court Committee on Appointed Attorneys and Ex-
perts] should be satisfied that each attorney is, in fact, qualified from the stand-
point of legal ability, ethics and diligence to assume the representation of his or
her clients and properly discharge his or her duties to the court.
J.C.J.M., supra note 48, at § II.C.
50. Id. at § IV.A.
51. Id. at § II.E.
52. In re J.G.L., 43 Cal. App. 3d 447, 117 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1974).
53. 127 Cal. App. 3d 348, 179 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1981).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 364, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 554 (citing In re Christopher B., 82 Cal. App. 3d 608,
614-15, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390, 393-94 (1978); Collins v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 3d 47,
141 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1977); In re Robert P., 61 Cal. App. 3d 310, 132 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1976).
56. 104 Cal. App. 3d 975, 164 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1980)).
57. Id. at 978, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 119.
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nor did it involve a fundamental right like parenting. Instead, Chev-
alier involved a defendant appealing a judgment against him for pu-
nitive damages in an assault and battery action. The Chevalier court
merely held that a defendant in a civil case is not entitled to a new
trial based on incompetent counsel where the defendant chose his
own private counsel. The Chevalier court, however, went on to note
that under due process an indigent is sometimes entitled to appoint-
ment of counsel at state expense in civil as well as criminal cases. 58
In particular, the Chevalier court referred to Salas v. Cortez which
held that due process required appointment of counsel in paternity
cases.
59
Since Chevalier specifically relied on Salas, it was erroneous
for Michael S. to rely on Chevalier for the proposition that incompe-
tency of counsel is not a right in dependency cases merely because
they had been termed "civil cases." In fact, Chevalier stated:
Although Salas was a right to counsel case, it can be expected
that the right to effective counsel will also be available to de-
fendants in similar cases. The fact that the right of effective
counsel is available to a defendant in a paternity case does not
mean that it is also available to a defendant in a punitive dam-
age case, merely because both are civil actions. Unlike a pater-
nity case, a punitive damage case involves only a monetary judg-
ment. Unlike a paternity case it cannot expose a defendant to a
possible deprivation of his liberty. Unlike a paternity case, a
punitive damage case does not involve state participation nor a
substantial state interest.60
It is apparent that Chevalier was limited to non-fundamental rights
civil cases involving monetary damages where appellant chose pri-
vate counsel. The Michael S. court, therefore, erred in relying on
Chevalier in rejecting the right to effective assistance of counsel for
indigent parents in dependency cases.61
In both dependency and parental severance cases, courts re-
cently began making a distinction between parents entitled to
competent counsel under the due process clause, and parents offered
58. Id. at 979, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
59. 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1979).
60. Chevalier, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 979, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 120 (emphasis added).
61. Once the state exercises its discretion to appoint counsel for indigent parents in de-
pendency cases, parents should have a right to due process in relation to the appointment of
counsel. See Bailey v. Loggins, 32 Cal. 3d 907, 654 P.2d 758, 187 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1982).
Since the indigent parents detrimentally relied upon the court's appointment of competent
counsel, it would be unfair for the state to prohibit the parents from seeking the only effective
remedy, setting aside the verdict. See also Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960).
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counsel pursuant to the trial court's statutory discretion. In In re
Christina H. , 2 the court held that parents entitled to counsel as a
due process right in a dependency trial are also entitled to effective
assistance of counsel if they face a substantial likelihood of losing
custody of their child." However, that case has not been extended to
parents given counsel under California Welfare and Institutions
Code section 317, which is a statutory discretionary right, not a con-
stitutional due process right. Likewise, in In re Christina P. ,4 the
court held that parents entitled to counsel on due process grounds in
a parental severance trial have a right to effective assistance of
counsel.6
5
Although the due process/statutory distinction has been applied
to parents' rights to effective counsel, that distinction is absent in
opinions addressing the minor's right to effective representation. In
In re Patricia E.," the court, pursuant to California Welfare and
Institutions Code section 318, appointed county counsel to represent
the minor in a dependency hearing.6 After ruling that the minor
received inadequate assistance of counsel, the court stated, "[tlhe mi-
nor has a statutory right to appointment of counsel. That right nec-
essarily entails a right to effective assistance of the counsel ap-
pointed." 68 The court did not raise the due process/statutory
distinction. Further, in In re Rico W. ," a minor alleged that the
trial court in a parental severance trial abused its discretion by deny-
ing appointment of separate counsel for the minor under California
Civil Code section 237.5(a).70 Without discussing the due process/
62. 182 Cal. App. 3d 47, 227 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1986).
63. Id. However, in In re Ammanda G., 186 Cal./App. 3d 1075, 231 Cal. Rptr. 372(1986), the court clarified Christina H. by holding that parents granted counsel pursuant to
statute in a dependency case do not have a right to effective assistance of counsel.
64. 175 Cal. App. 3d 115, 220 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1985).
65. Id. at 128-29, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 531-32.
66. 174 Cal. App. 3d 1, 219 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1985).
67. Id.
[Wihen a minor who is alleged to be a person described in subdivision (d) of
Section 300 appears before the juvenile court at a detention hearing the court
shall appoint counsel. The court may appoint county counsel to represent the
minor, if there is no conflict of interest between the county and the minor, or the
district attorney pursuant to Section 351.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 318 (West Supp. 1987).
68. 174 Cal. App. 3d at 9, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 787-88.
69. 179 Cal. App. 3d 1169, 225 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1986).
70. Civil Code section 237.5(a) provides, "[tihe court shall consider whether the inter-
ests of the minor require the appointment of counsel. If the court finds that the interests of the
minor do require such protection, the court shall appoint counsel to represent the minor."
CAL. CIv. CODE § 237.5(a) (West 1982).
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statutory distinction, Rico W. concluded that failure to appoint inde-
pendent counsel amounts to reversible error only where there has
been a miscarriage of justice, which the minor failed to prove. The
court also denied the minor's claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel since it was not shown that a determination more favorable to the
minor was reasonably probable absent counsel's incompetence. 7
The fact that there was no mention of the due process/statutory
distinction in cases discussing children's rights to competent counsel
gives rise to two questions: 1) is the due process/statutory distinction
consistent with the purposes of dependency and parental severance
law; and 2) can the inapplicability of that distinction to minors sur-
vive an equal protection analysis? 'There is, of course, a visceral ra-
tionality to the due process/statutory distinction based upon the ad-
age "beggars can't be choosers." If there is no right to counsel under
the Lassiter due process standards, complaints about the attorney
provided by the state based upon the judge's discretion are unjusti-
fied. This rationale smacks of the antiquated rights/privileges dis-
tinction frequently rejected in modern constitutional law. 72
The state has no interest in providing incompetent advocates or
in denying parents relief from their appointed counsel's ineffective
assistance. At first blush, money appears paramount; if parents have
no right to review issues of counsel's incompetence, appeals will be
shorter and the cost of retrials will be saved. But those immediate
savings must be viewed through the long term cost of foster place-
ment and family reunification services. In Los Angeles County in
December 1982, 4,000 children were in foster care.73 In 1984 there
were 14,584 children in court-ordered out-of-home placement and
22,965 children under dependency court protection.7 In Los Angeles
County the "largest single service item purchased from the private
sector in 1984-85 was foster care, including $73.7 million spent for
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (A.F.D.C.) and $1.8 mil-
lion spent by the Probation Department for non-A.F.D.C. chil-
71. In re Rico W., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1178, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 477. The court analo-
gized the standard of review to criminal incompetence of counsel in questioning whether "the
Fosselman [People v. Fosselman, 33 Cal. 3d 572, 584, 659 P.2d 1144, 1151, 189 Cal. Rptr.
855, 862 (1983)] standard is appropriately applied in evaluating the effectiveness of counsel in
proceedings to terminate parental rights. Id. See also In re R.S., 167 Cal. App. 3d 946,
969, 213 Cal. Rptr. 690, 695 (1985).
72. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Consti-
tutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
73. Roundtable, 1984, supra note 3, at 43.
74. Id. at 47.
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dren. ' '75 In addition, in the 1984-85 budget, $1 million was provided
for in-home counseling services and $3.3 million for professional ap-
pointments. 6 The federal, state and local governments, therefore,
have an economic interest in making certain that children are not
needlessly separated from their families since years of "foster place-
ment drift" cost thousands of dollars per child. Further, the increase
in litigation costs regarding appellate review of issues of incompe-
tency of counsel is minimal in relation to foster care and family
reunification costs. The number of new appeals based exclusively
upon ineffective assistance of counsel will likely be small. The prob-
able result is that a new issue merely will be added to cases already
being appealed on other grounds, thus requiring more extensive ap-
pellate review.
Aside from the governmental economic advantage of leaving
children in the custody of their parents whenever possible, the state
has a specifically defined purpose of assuring that a disposition is in
the child's best interests and that the core social unit, the family, is
not displaced unless absolutely necessary. 77 If the court's fact-finding
was affected by the parents' incompetent counsel, the state has a
compelling interest to review the case so that a child is not needlessly
separated from his family. Thus far, no court has required the gov-
ernment to prove that a safer, better environment is available for
abused or neglected children. Taking temporary custody from par-
ents or permanently severing parental ties is no guarantee that the
child will find a more loving or safer environment. 8 Therefore, it
makes good economic and social sense to provide parents with review
of their claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition, there
is a serious due process question in permitting the state to appoint
75. Roundtable, 1986, supra note 3, at 21. The state reimburses foster parents $291 to
$408 per child per month. Accord Reached on Liability Insurance for Foster Families, L.A.
Daily J., August 29, 1986, § I, at 2, col. 3.
76. Roundtable, 1986, supra note 3, at 22. Approximately 35% of the Children's Pro-
tective Services budget is paid by the county. However, the prediction is that the state and
county share will dramatically increase as the federal government attempts to reduce the deficit
by decreasing general revenue sharing. Id. at 31.
77. See In re La Shonda B., 95 Cal. App. 3d 593, 157 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1979); In re
Jack H., 106 Cal. App. 3d 257, 165 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1980); In re David B., 91 Cal. App. 3d
184, 154 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1979).
78. There have been increasing numbers of cases of children being abused or neglected
in foster homes and county placements. Only a small percentage of children separated from
their families are adopted. Foster family drift is too commonplace. Approximately 1,000 chil-
dren a month in Los Angeles County are removed from their parents' homes and placed in
protective custody. In August 1986, approximately 14,000 children in Los Angeles County
needed placement, but only 3,500 foster homes were available. To Become a Foster Parent in
L.A., L.A. Times, August 28, 1986, part V, at 17, col. 1.
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counsel without providing a judicial remedy for ineffective assistance
of counsel. Moreover, the equal protection question of providing re-
view for children with statutorily appointed counsel but not for par-
ents, leads to a single conclusion: the due process/statutory distinc-
tion is bad law. Parents with court-appointed counsel should have
access to appellate review concerning allegations of incompetent as-
sistance of counsel. Only then can the trial court adequately consider
all the issues, facts and law relevant to determining if court jurisdic-
tion is required and what placement is in the child's best interests.
C. The Appropriate Standard of Professional Competence
The notion that a dependency trial is merely a non-adversarial
civil hearing has slowly begun to wane. 79 Although the purpose of
the proceeding is to protect the welfare of the child and not to punish
the parents, recent analogies to the criminal justice system have re-
sulted in an expansion of rights for parents in dependency cases.80 In
In re Brian B.,8" the court held that the stringent appellate review
procedures accorded to criminal defendants in People v. Wende'2 are
applicable to dependency appeals.a8 Brian B. found "no valid reason
to accord a parent in that situation [possible loss of fundamental
right to rear child] a lesser degree of review than is accorded a crimi-
nal defendant."'8 4 The question is whether the California standard
for competency of counsel in criminal cases involving the fundamen-
tal right of liberty should be extended to dependency and parental
severance cases which involve the fundamental right of parenting.
There are currently two tests in California for the competence
of criminal defense counsel. First, under People v. Pope,8
"[d]efendant must show that trial counsel failed to act in a manner to
be expected of reasonably competent attorneys acting as diligent ad-
79. In re Rodriquez, 34 Cal. App. 3d 510, 110 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1973).
80. In re La Shonda B., 95 Cal. App. 3d at 593, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
81. 141 Cal. App. 3d 397, 190 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1983).
82. 25 Cal. 3d 436, 600 P.2d 1071, 158 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1979).
83. Brian B., 141 Cal. App. 3d at 398, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 154 (citing People v. Wende,
25 Cal. 3d 436, 600 P.2d 1071, 158 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1979)). In Wende the California Supreme
Court held that the court of appeal must independently review the entire trial record when
appellate counsel indicates there are no viable appellate issues. See also In re Jesse H., 126
Cal. App. 3d 1048, 178 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1981).
84. 141 Cal. App. 3d at 399, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 154. In Lassiter v. Department of Social
Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981), the United States Supreme Court noted the similarities between
child dependency cases and criminal trials. And in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760-70
(1982), the court held that the state must provide parents fundamentally fair procedures.
85. 23 Cal. 3d 412, 590 P.2d 859, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1979).
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vocates. In addition, [appellant] must establish that counsel's acts or
omissions resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious de-
fense." 6 In the alternative, according to People v. Fosselman,87 a
defendant can prove ineffectiveness "if he establishes that his counsel
failed to perform with reasonable competence and that it is reasona-
bly probable a determination more favorable to the defendant would
have resulted in the absence of counsel's failings." 8 Furthermore, in
criminal cases the identical tests for determining ineffectiveness of
counsel are applicable in cases of both retained and court-appointed
counsel since the right to counsel is based on both the due process
clause and the sixth amendment right to counsel. 89
The alternative to the criminal PopelFosselman standard for
incompetency of counsel is the standard of professional competence
set forth in civil malpractice cases:
The general rule . . . is that the attorney, by accepting employ-
ment to give legal advice or to render other legal services,
impliedly agrees to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as
lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and
exercise in the performance of the tasks which they undertake.90
Thus, an attorney in a civil case has a duty to research the subject
matter of the particular case. Even when an issue of law is uncer-
tain, an attorney must make a reasonable effort in furtherance of her
client's needs.91 The standard of reasonable care also requires the
attorney to conduct a factual investigation during the early stages of
representation. 2 Therefore, as in the criminal Pope/Fosselman
standard, incompetence in civil malpractice cases involves both erro-
neous advice as well as failure to advise or investigate. 9 The plain-
86. Id. at 415, 590 P.2d at 860, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
87. 33 Cal. 3d 572, 659 P.2d 1144, 189 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1983).
88. Id. at 584, 659 P.2d at 1151, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
89. People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 161-62, 599 P.2d 587, 598, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281,
291-92 (1979). Therefore, the distinction between retained and appointed counsel in civil
cases, which Chevalier relied upon in holding there was no right to effective assistance of
counsel, is not followed in California criminal law. Since the right to counsel in civil cases is
based exclusively upon the due process clause, the distinction between retained and court-
appointed counsel stands on firmer ground unless there is an equal protection violation. Some
states have sustained the distinction between retained and court-appointed counsel because
there is no state action when counsel is retained. See 89 HARV. L. REV. 593, 598-99 & n.30
(1976); 67 GEO. L.J. 17, 520-21 & n.1489 (1978).
90. Kirsch v. Duryea, 21 Cal. 3d 303, 308, 578 P.2d 935, 938-39, 146 Cal. Rptr. 218,
221 (1978).
91. Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975).
92. Cline v. Watkins, 66 Cal. App. 3d 174, 178, 135 Cal. Rptr. 838, 840 (1977).
93. In Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966), an
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tiff's burden in a legal malpractice action is to demonstrate a cause
which, in natural and continuous sequence, produces the damage
and without which the damage would not have occurred. Under
Pope the criminal defendant need only prove that his attorney with-
drew a possibly meritorious defense; the defendant need not prove
that incompetence caused the conviction. However, in Fosselman and
in civil malpractice cases, the client must not only demonstrate un-
reasonable acts or omissions by his attorney, but also must demon-
strate that the lawyer's incompetence proximately resulted in convic-
tion or civil damages.
The PopelFosselman standard of review is appropriate in de-
pendency and parental severance cases for several reasons. First, all
three trials involve fundamental rights. As the United States Su-
preme Court has noted, the fact finding process in each of those sys-
tems is substantially similar.94 The existing procedures for reviewing
errors in the three hearings are identical. In the criminal case, if the
grounds for incompetency of counsel do not appear on the face of the
trial record, the defendant must file a writ of habeas corpus.95 Re-
view of errors in dependency actions may be brought by habeas
corpus whenever an appeal is an inadequate remedy."' If the Pope
standard regarding incompetency of presenting defenses is applied to
dependency and parental severance cases, parents must demonstrate
that counsel's acts or omissions resulted in the "withdrawal of a po-
tentially meritorious defense."'97 However, when allegations of in-
competency of counsel involve issues other than possibly meritorious
defenses, the parents must demonstrate, as in Fosselman, that the
unreasonable representation proximately caused a detrimental result
in the dependency or parental severance trial.
Three opinions have recently considered the appropriate stan-
dard of review for allegations of incompetence of counsel in depen-
dency and parental severance trials. In re Patricia E. involved a de-
pendency case in which appointed counsel had a conflict of interest
with the minor. The court determined that the standard of prejudice
for reversal for error is the criminal standard under People v.
attorney representing both a husband and wife in a divorce action was found negligent. The
court stated: "IhIere the attorney is not charged with erroneous advise but with failure to
advice, failure to investigate, failure to disclose." Id. at 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
94. See generally Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
95. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d at 428, 590 P.2d at 868, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 741.
96. People v. Allgood, 54 Cal. App. 3d 434, 439, 126 Cal. Rptr. 666, 671 (1976).
97. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d at 415, 590 P.2d at 860, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
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Mroczko;"' reversal is required if the record supports " 'an informed
speculation' that appellant's right to effective representation was
prejudicially affected."" Patricia E. applied the criminal standard
for reversible error because the minor has a statutory right to counsel
which "necessarily entails a right to effective assistance of the coun-
sel appointed." 100 In In re Christina P., the court discussed the
criminal Fosselman standard in a parental severance trial involving
alleged incompetence of counsel.'01 However, the court reversed
upon other grounds, stating, "[w]e express no view whether this
standard [Fosselman] should be applied to civil cases in which inef-
fective assistance of counsel is a cognizable claim."'02 Finally, in In
re Rico W., the court determined that appellant failed to demonstrate
prejudice under the Fosselman standard without holding that Fos-
selman was the applicable standard regarding incompetence of coun-
sel in parental severance trials. The court stated that:
If, in fact, the Fosselman standard is appropriately applied in
evaluating the effectiveness of counsel in proceedings to termi-
nate parental rights, appellant may not succeed with her claim
absent a showing that "it is reasonably probable a determina-
tion more favorable to [her] would have resulted in the absence
of Counsel's failings."'1 8
The remedy for parents who are denied effective assistance of
counsel must necessarily be the same as the remedy for criminal de-
fendants. Pope stated that "a conviction may not be upheld if the
state has furnished an indigent with representation of lower quality
than that of a reasonably competent attorney acting as a diligent,
conscientious advocate."'0 4 The only remedy is reversal of the convic-
tion. In civil malpractice cases, the remedy is to make the aggrieved
party whole:
Few cases have considered what constitutes the proper measure
of damages in a legal malpractice action. The general rule is
that a plaintiff is entitled only to be made whole: i.e., when the
attorney's negligence lies in his failure to press a meritorious
98. 35 Cal. 3d 86, 672 P.2d 835, 197 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1983).
99. Patricia E., 174 Cal. App. 3d at 9, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 791 (quoting Mroczko, 35 Cal.
3d at 105, 672 P.2d at 846, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 62).
100. 174 Cal. App. 3d at 9, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
101. 175 Cal. App. 3d at 129, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
102. Id. at 130, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 532.
103. 179 Cal. App. 3d 1169, 1178, 225 Cal. Rptr. 472, 477 (1986) (quoting People v.
Fosselman, 33 Cal. 3d 572, 584, 659 P.2d 1144, 1151, 189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 862 (1983)) (cita-
tions omitted).
104. 23 Cal. 3d at 424, 590 P.2d at 865-66, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 738-39.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
claim, the measure of damages is the value of the claim lost.105
The legal malpractice remedy is obviously inadequate in dependency
and parental severance cases since monetary damages cannot com-
pensate parents for the loss of the fundamental right to rear their
child. However, in Kim v. Orellana'° ' the court stated reversal is an
improper remedy in the ordinary civil legal malpractice case for two
reasons. First, there is no state action which implicated the federal or
state due process clauses. Second, "[w]ith the exception of a court
appointment the relationship of attorney and client is created by con-
tract, express or implied. '10 7 But in dependency and parental
severance cases, indigent parents are represented by court-appointed
attorneys; there is state action and there is no freedom to contract for
specific counsel. Reversal will not place children in jeopardy since
the prosecution can immediately schedule a new detention hearing to
determine the conditions of the child's placement pending retrial.
D. Jurisdictional Issues Regarding Incompetence of Counsel
As in the criminal justice system, a majority of litigated depen-
dency cases result in negotiated pleas. This section examines whether
a parent's plea, based on subsequently discovered incompetent advice
from his attorney, may be set aside.
In criminal cases the issues of ineffective assistance of counsel
and ineffective waivers of constitutional rights are reviewable even
after a guilty plea.108 Further., unlike incompetence of counsel at
trial, where a defendant's guilt was determined by his own pleas, it
is more difficult to determine whether he would have pled differently
in the absence of counsel's failings. Therefore, rather than the Popel
Fosselman review standards, a question of the validity of a guilty
plea in relation to alleged incompetence of counsel is determined by
"whether counsel's acts or omissions adversely affected defendant's
ability to knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily decide to enter a
plea of guilty."' 0' 9 However, a criminal defendant is barred by the
doctrine of laches if the guilty plea is not attacked within a reasona-
ble period of time. But, laches is not applicable where the defendant
105. Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 362, 530 P.2d 589, 597, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621, 629
(1975).
106. 145 Cal. App. 3d 1024, 193 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1983).
107. Id. at 1028, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
108. People v. Natividad, 222 Cal. App. 2d 438, 440-41, 35 Cal. Rptr. 237, 239 (1963);
People v. Coffey, 67 Cal. 2d 204, 211-12, 430 P.2d 15, 20, 60 Cal. Rptr. 457, 462 (1967);
People v. Ribero, 4 Cal. 3d 55, 48 P.2d 308, 92 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1971).
109. People v. McCary, 166 Cal. App. 3d 1, 10, 212 Cal. Rptr. 114, 118 (1985).
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"is indigent and does not have the capacity to represent himself." 10
In dependency and parental severance cases, the juvenile court
maintains jurisdiction over the custody and control of minors until
the parents' appellate remedies have been exhausted."' In In re
Katherine R.,112 the court rejected appellant's argument that the ju-
venile court had no jurisdiction to change its order pending the
appeal: "Wardship, or jurisdiction over the person of the minor, is a
continuing condition or status for the welfare of the child and
changed circumstances must be considered in any proceeding con-
cerning the child's status, even though such changed circumstances
may develop during the pendency of the appeal."" 3 Because of the
necessity of continually monitoring dependent minors, California
Code of Civil Procedure section 473 does not control dependency
actions, and the six-month maximum term for relief from a court
judgment or order is inapplicable."1 ' Instead, California Welfare and
110. In re Spears, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1203, 1208, 204 Cal. Rptr. 333, 335-36 (1984). In
Spears, there was an 18 month delay between the guilty plea and the habeas petition. The
court noted that "18 months is not a significant delay since defendant lacked the capacity to
represent himself." Id. at 1208, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 336. See also In re Huddleston, 71 Cal. 2d
1031, 1034, 458 P.2d 507, 508-09, 80 Cal. Rptr. 595, 596 (1969) (two and a half year delay
no laches); In re Hancock, 67 Cal. App. 3d 943, 945 n.1, 136 Cal. Rptr. 901, 903 n.1 (1977)
(nine month delay not unreasonable).
111. Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.25(0 states that "[w]hen an adoption of
the minor has been granted, the court shall terminate its jurisdiction of the minor." CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.25(0 (West 1984) [superseded by id. at § 366.25 (West Supp.
1987)]. Further, Civil Code section 239(b) directs that "no petition for adoption may be heard
until the appellate rights of the natural parents have been exhausted." CAL. CIv. CODE §
239(b) (West 1982).
112. 6 Cal. App. 3d 354, 86 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1970).
113. Id. at 356, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 282; In re Steven S., 126 Cal. App. 3d 23, 31, 178
Cal. Rptr. 525, 533 (1981). The court maintains jurisdiction during the appeal concerning
conditions of visitation also. In In re Adoption of Pierce, 5 Cal. App. 3d 316, 320, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 104, 108 (1970), the court stated that "if petitioner succeeds on his appeal that relation-
ship [between the child and his parents] will, necessarily, be resumed. But the interruption of
that relationship for the unhappily too long period before the appeal here can be decided
would . . . involve a serious trauma to the young child." Id.
114. A motion for equitable relief from a judgment or order "must be made within a
reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after such judgment . . . was taken .. "
CAL. Civ. PRoC. CODE § 473 (West 1973). Section 473 cannot limit parent's review of the
denial of effective assistance of counsel. Article I, section 11 of the California Constitution
provides a constitutional right to the remedy of a writ of habeas corpus to determine whether a
person is lawfully being held in custody. Furthermore, under article 6, section 10, the superior
courts have "original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings." CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10.
Article I, section 11 states that "[hiabeas corpus may not be suspended unless required by
public safety in cases of rebellion or invasion." Id. at art. I, § 11. Therefore, any finding that
Civil Code section 473 has taken away the constitutional review of the legality of the custody
of a parent's child, pursuant to article I, section 11 and article VI, section 10, is unconstitu-
tional as applied. Further, extraordinary relief by writ is the preferred remedy in cases involv-
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Institutions Code section 388 controls the modification or setting
aside of all court orders in dependency cases. Section 388 permits a
dependent child's parent to petition "for a hearing to change, modify,
or set aside any order of court previously made or to terminate the
jurisdiction of the court."11 Further, any child custody conditions
ordered pursuant to California Civil Code section 4600 are always
subject to modification." 6 Therefore, as long as the parents seek to
set aside the nolo contendere plea before their appellate remedies are
exhausted, the court has jurisdiction under either California Welfare
and Institutions Code section 388 or California Constitution article
I, section 11 and article VI, section 10 to set aside the nolo con-
tendere plea."1
ing the best interest of the child since it enables rapid decisions which will place the child in a
permanent and stable environment as soon as possible. San Diego County Dep't of Public
Welfare v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 1, 9, 496 P.2d 453, 458, 101 Cal. Rptr. 541, 546-47
(1972); People v. Allgood, 54 Cal. App. 3d 434, 439, 126 Cal. Rptr. 666, 669 (1976); Peyton
v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58-60 (1968).
115. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 388 (West 1984). The current legislative scheme
protects the best interests of the child by providing the trial court discretion to modify or set
aside a judgment based on new evidence, and provides finality of all dependency court rulings
upon the termination of court jurisdiction or upon adoption of the child. Because of the contin-
uing necessity to monitor a child's placement, California courts for years have ruled that deci-
sions regarding the temporary placement of children are not res judicata. Lucachevitch v. Lu-
cachevitch, 69 Cal. App. 2d 478, 485, 159 P.2d 688, 692 (1945).
116. Civil Code section 4600 concerns custody orders regarding children and sets out a
public policy favoring placement of the child with its natural parents if possible. Section 4600
governs the placement of children under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 300 and 232
cases. There are numerous occasions under the California statutory scheme for concurrent
jurisdiction by different courts over the custody of a minor. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4600, 4601
(West 1983); Dupes v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 440, 168 P. 888 (1917).
117. Since most court-appointed attorneys will be representing indigent parents who
have little or no legal training, it is absurd to expect the parents on their own to be able to
determine whether they have received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Therefore, to set
an arbitrary cut-off for setting aside the judgment, as in an ordinary civil case pursuant to
Civil Code section 473, is unfair. Often, the question of incompetency of counsel does not arise
until an appellate attorney has reviewed the record. Therefore, if the doctrine of laches is
applicable to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and Civil Code section 232 cases, it
should not begin to run until after the parents have discovered the incompetence. That would
be similar to tort actions where the statute of limitations begins upon discovery of the injury or
professional malpractice. Myers v. Stevenson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 399, 402, 270 P.2d 885, 887
(1954); Rawlings v. Harris, 265 Cal. App. 2d 452, 455, 71 Cal. Rptr. 288, 291 (1968); CAL.
CIV. PRoc. CODE §§ 340.5, 340.6 (West 1982).
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III. CURRENT LAWS VIOLATE PARENTS' PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION, PUNISH PARENTS WHO COOPERATE WITH
DEPENDENCY INVESTIGATORS AND FRUSTRATE THE LEGISLA-
TURE'S CENTRAL GOALS OF QUICK RESOLUTION OF FAMILY
PROBLEMS AND PERMANENT, STABLE PLACEMENT FOR
CHILDREN
Approximately eighty percent of dependency cases result in ne-
gotiated settlements. 18 Whether the resolution occurs in a formal
settlement conference or on the courtroom steps, the settlement usu-
ally involves the parents' nolo contendere plea to an amended peti-
tion, thus giving the court jurisdiction over the child."' The state's
benefit of the bargain is obvious; the expense and uncertainty of trial
is avoided, and the court can fashion conditions of custody in the
child's best interests. 20
However, the parents' benefits of the plea bargain may be illu-
sory. The advantages and disadvantages the parents receive for waiv-
ing their right to trial, privilege against self-incrimination, right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses and right to compulsory court
process must be examined. 2' If the negotiations fail, the parents'
case may be detrimentally affected.
If the parents engage in formalized negotiation at a pre-trial
settlement conference, a stipulation could prevent parents' statements
during that conference from being used at the jurisdictional hear-
ing. 22 However, the standard court stipulation form provides, sub-ject to the rules of evidence, that parents' statements may be used at
the disposition hearing, and that "[ajll other information obtained
during the course of the Pre-Adjudication Social Study, including in-
formation obtained subsequent to or as a result of interviews with
the parent(s) . . .may be used at any juvenile dependency hearing,
subject to the rules of evidence, and may be used in any other lawful
manner."'2 8 The plea bargain settlement negotiation hearing is
fraught with potential dangers for parents because the stipulation
118. 2 CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT PRACTICE § 22.19 (CEB) (1981).
119. In lieu of admitting the allegations of the petition, the parent or guardian may
enter no contest concerning the truth of the allegations, subject to the approval of the court.
CAL. R. CT. 1364(e) (West 1987).
120. "County counsel [which prosecutes Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 cases
in Los Angeles County] does not have the staff to try every case that is filed. 2 CALI-
FORNIA JUVENILE COURT PRACTICE, supra note 118, § 22.19, at 196.
121. CAL. R. CT. 1364(a) (West 1987).
122. 2 CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT PRACTICE, supra note 118, § 22.19, at 196.
123. Id., § 22.19, at 73.
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merely provides parents use immunity at the jurisdiction hearing re-
garding statements made during the negotiation. The stipulation
does not prohibit using the parents' statements against them in a
dispositional hearing, status review hearing, permanency planning
hearing, parental severance hearing, or criminal trial based upon the
same transactional facts.124 Further, the stipulation does not provide
derivative or transactional immunity; thus, during the settlement ne-
gotiation the parents are providing the prosecutor with informal dis-
covery of data which might be otherwise unobtainable. That is a
high price to pay for the mere opportunity to discuss a potential
settlement.
A. Pre-trial Statements
There is currently no case law regarding the use of evidence
gleaned by the prosecutor during dependency settlement negotiations.
However, since the California Evidence Code and case law control
the admission of evidence in dependency cases, some evidentiary pa-
rameters have been charted. 25 It is clear that an offer to settle or
negotiate a civil action is not admissible at trial to prove liability. 6
Statements made during the negotiation of a civil case are likewise
inadmissible to prove liability.127 Offers to negotiate, statements and
conduct during pre-trial settlements are excluded at trial in order to
promote dispute resolution and to "facilitate candid discussion which
may lead to settlement of disputes." 2 8 Thus, parents' statements and
124. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 358, 366.2, 366.25 (West 1984); CAL. CIV. CODE §
232 (West 1982). The chronology of child dependency trials requires a series of hearings to
determine whether the court should continue jurisdiction, dismiss the case, change conditions of
custody, or refer the case for parental severance and ultimate adoption or guardianship
proceedings.
125. "Except as provided in sections 355.1 through 355.7 [none of these sections are
applicable to the instant topic], the admission and exclusion of evidence shall be in accordance
with the rules of evidence established by the Evidence Code and by judicial decision." CAL. R.
CT. 1365(c) (West 1987).
126. Cano v. Tyrell, 256 Cal. App. 2d 824, 833-34, 64 Cal. Rptr. 522, 525 (1967);
Coppinger v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. App. 3d 883, 890, 185 Cal. Rptr. 24, 28 (1982).
127. Moving Picture Mach. Operators Union Local No. 162 v. Glasgow Theaters, Inc.,
6 Cal. App. 3d 395, 86 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970). "[Clonduct or statements made in negotiation
...[are] inadmissible to prove . . . liability for the loss or damage or any part of it." CAL.
EvID. CODE § 1152(a) (West Supp. 1987). See also Coppinger, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 890, 185
Cal. Rptr. at 28; Luis v. Cavin, 88 Cal. App. 2d 107, 114, 198 P.2d 563, 568 (1948); FED. R.
EvID. 408.
128. Fieldson Assoc., Inc. v. Whitecliff Laboratories, Inc., 276 Cal. App. 2d 770, 773,
81 Cal. Rptr. 332, 334 (1969). The Legislature's desire to break the litigation log-jam by
encouraging voluntary out-of-court settlements is reflected by the extension of inadmissible
information to mediations. Evidence Code section 1152.5(a)(1) provides that upon agreement
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offers to negotiate in dependency cases should be inadmissible during
the jurisdictional hearing to determine whether the allegations of
abuse or neglect are true. In addition to the policy of promoting set-
tlement through candid discussion, the exclusion of evidence gathered
in settlement negotiations promotes the best interests of the child be-
cause a settlement will avoid protracted trials and appeals. The court
will be able to readily order services to remedy the problem trigger-
ing court jurisdiction and immediately order family reunification
measures. The Legislature's primary desire to provide children sta-
ble home environments as expeditiously as possible is furthered by
applying immunity pursuant to California Evidence Code sections
1152 and 1152.5 to dependency cases.1"9
However, Evidence Code sections 1152 and 1152.5 do not pro-
vide parents sufficient protection from subsequent use of evidence
garnered in pre-trial negotiations. Section 1152 merely prohibits the
introduction of the evidence for the limited purpose of proving "lia-
bility for the loss or damage" claimed in the litigation. Section 1152
appears broad enough to cover the dependency jurisdiction question
of whether parents neglected or abused their child. But, does section
1152 extend to statements during negotiation concerning the disposi-
tional issues of appropriate placement and conditions of custody for
the children?130 In Fieldson Associates v. Whitecliff Laboratories"'1
the court noted an exception to section 1152 which prohibits evi-
dence of offers to compromise. The main question before the court
was whether letters between the parties written after a purchase or-
der were admissible because they contained offers to compromise.
The Fieldson court held the letters admissible for the limited pur-
pose of "showing the nonbinding nature of the 'purchase order' in
order to defeat the appellant's cross-complaint."1 '' The court held
of the parties to the mediation, "[e]vidence of anything said or of any admission made in the
course of the mediation is not admissible in evidence . . . in any civil action, in which, pursu-
ant to law, testimony can be compelled to be given." CAL. EvID. CODE § 1152.5(a)(1) (West
Supp. 1987).
129. If the court orders a child removed from a parent's custody, "the juvenile court
shall order the probation officer to provide child welfare services to the minor and the minor's
parents or guardians for the purpose of facilitating reunification of the family within a maxi-
mum time period not to exceed 12 months." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(a) (West
Supp. 1987).
130. Frequently parents are willing to give the court jurisdiction of their child in ex-
change for an in-home placement, child welfare services, and parenting and counseling ser-
vices. Thus, the real center of negotiation is focused on placement rather than court jurisdic-
tion. See 2 CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT PRACTICE, supra note 118, § 17.18, at 73.
131. 276 Cal. App. 2d 770, 81 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1969).
132. d. at 772, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 333-34.
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that appellant's cross-complaint for lost profits under the purchase
order was never mentioned in the negotiations. The letters were not
admitted to prove liability, but merely demonstrated that the parties
were in communication. The admissibility of that evidence did not
affect the policy of promoting settlement and facilitating candid dis-
cussion because the subject of the cross-complaint was never men-
tioned during the negotiations."' 3 But this limited exception to sec-
tion 1152 should not apply to dependency negotiations involving
custody issues or placement conditions. These issues are intimately
related to the negotiation, but are not formally litigated until the
bifurcated disposition hearing.""
Evidence Code sections 1152 and 1152.5 are inadequate protec-
tions for parents because they merely prohibit use of data derived
from negotiation in the same civil case. The statutes do not insulate
parents from having their statements used against them in a parental
severance trial or a criminal trial based upon the identical facts. The
scope of protection under sections 1152 and 1152.5 is too narrow to
truly encourage parents to fully disclose the essential facts necessary
to reach a pre-trial settlement and to immediately begin family
reunification services.
1. Minor's Statements in Welfare and Institutions Code Sec-
tion 707 Fitness Hearings
Courts are beginning to admit more frequently that child de-
pendency cases are not just civil trials, but rather are quasi-criminal
or criminal in nature.1 5 This change mirrors a similar growing rec-
ognition that juvenile delinquency proceedings are quasi-criminal. 6
Recently, one court noted that where a father faced loss of custody of
133. Id. at 773, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
134. "After finding that a minor is a person described in Section 300 the court shall
hear evidence on the question of the proper disposition to be made of the matter." CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 358 (West 1984).
135. The traditional characterization of child dependency cases as civil trials has been
derived from analogies to marital child custody disputes where the contest is between parents.
In re Robinson, 8 Cal. App. 3d 783, 786, 87 Cal. Rptr. 678, 680 (1970); Kaufman v. Carter,
402 U.S. 964 (1971).
136. Many cases have noted the practical equivalence of adult and juvenile court
delinquency proceedings. In addition to the 'quasi-criminal' nature of juvenile
delinquency proceedings, and the 'widely held belief' that they are 'in reality
criminal proceedings,' it cannot be denied that both adult and juvenile proceed-
ings are designed, at least in part, to protect the public from the consequences of
criminal activity.
People v. Weidert, 39 Cal. 3d 836, 859, 705 P.2d 380, 394, 218 Cal. Rptr. 57, 71 (1985)
(Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting) (citations omitted).
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his daughter, as well as criminal charges arising out of the same
facts, the dependency hearing was "more nearly criminal than
civil. . . . ,,18 The effect of concluding that the child dependency
trial was criminal was dramatic because the dependency court ruled
that California Penal Code section 1112 prevented the father from
forcing a psychiatric examination of his daughter regarding sexual
abuse allegations.'3 8 Once the analogy between dependency cases and
delinquency and criminal trials is established, it becomes apparent
that pre-trial negotiation in dependency cases is, in reality, the
equivalent of criminal plea bargaining.
It has long been held that pre-trial statements made by a minor
to a probation officer, or to a court in a fitness hearing, cannot be
introduced as substantive evidence against the minor at trial."3 9 The
policy underlying exclusion of the minor's statements is similar to
that of Evidence Code sections 1152 and 1152.5, "the law's interest
in encouraging complete candor .. .""o Inadmissibility of the mi-
nor's pre-trial statements is also based upon fundamental fairness.
The minor "should not be put to the unfair choice of being consid-
ered uncooperative by the juvenile probation officer and juvenile
court because of his refusal to discuss his case with the probation
officer, or of having his statements to that officer used against him in
subsequent criminal proceedings." 41
Parents in child dependency proceedings face this same di-
lemma. The parent/probation officer relationship is critical in child
137. In re Dolly A., 177 Cal. App. 3d 195, 203, 222 Cal. Rptr. 741, 745 (1986).
138. Penal Code section 1112 provides that "the trial court shall not order any prosecut-ing witness, complaining witness, or any other witness, or victim in any sexual assault prose-
cution to submit to a psychiatric or psychological examination for the purpose of assessing his
or her credibility." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1112 (West 1985). It is truly ironic after decades ofparents arguing that child dependency trials are criminal, so that the full panoply of criminal
defendant's rights would enure to dependency parents, that the first court to accept the analogy
applied criminal law preventing a parent from exercising a civil discovery device. However,
the case of In re Dolly A., 177 Cal. App. 3d 195, 222 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1986), has served adouble-decker irony since the criminal process analogy must sweep toward more rights fordependency parents. In the long run, the criminal process analogy will provide parents with
greater, not fewer, protections.
139. Bryan v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 575, 586-87, 498 P.2d 1079, 1087, 102 Cal.Rptr. 831, 839 (1972). A fitness hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section
707 determines whether a minor should be tried under the juvenile court law or in an adult
criminal court. The probation officer is required to investigate and submit a report determin-ing whether the minor would be amenable to the care, treatment and training program availa-
ble through the facilities of the juvenile court.
140. In re Wayne H., 24 Cal. 3d 595, 599, 596 P.2d 1, 4, 156 Cal. Rptr. 344, 347
(1979).
141. Bryan, 7 Cal. 3d at 587-88, 498 P.2d at 1087, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
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dependency proceedings. The probation officer initially investigates
the facts to determine whether court intervention is necessary, and
continues to supervise the case during the twelve-month period of
family reunification.14 There is thus a continuing relationship be-
tween the parents and the probation officer. In invoking jurisdiction
over the minor, the court sets conditions of custody and defines the
program of education and counseling that parents must complete in
order to regain custody of their child.4 '3 If parents fail to participate
in court-ordered treatment programs or fail to cooperate or avail
themselves of the services provided, this is prima facie evidence that
returning the minor to the parents would be detrimental.
144 The
court must consider the probation officer's report in determining
whether the parents have cooperated with the reunification plan.
14 5
Therefore, unless the parents have a good, continuing relationship
with the probation officer and follow the probation officer's recom-
mendations, a presumption of detriment may arise. This is a result
harsher than that imposed upon juveniles in fitness hearings, because
the government's case in the child dependency proceeding is aided by
prima facie evidence of detriment. Therefore, the parents' dilemma is
profound; if they do not speak to the probation officer or therapists,
they will be characterized as uncooperative and may never regain
custody of their child. However, if they cooperate and candidly dis-
close their intimate thoughts and discuss facts underlying the alleged
abuse or neglect, those statements may be admitted in court against
them.
If a parent's silence can support a finding of non-participation
or uncooperativeness which triggers a prima facie showing of detri-
ment to the minor, the parent's due process right may be violated.
The parent's assertion of his privilege against self-incrimination will
142. The Welfare and Institutions Code provides that "[it shall be the duty of the
probation officer to prepare for every hearing . . . a social study of the minor, containing such
matters as may be relevant to a proper disposition of the case. Such social study shall include a
recommendation for the disposition of the case." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 280 (West
1984). See also id. at § 281. "Even with due process safeguards an adverse probation depart-
ment report can be very difficult to overcome." Comment, Proceedings to Terminate Parental
Rights: Too Much or Too Little Protection for Parents 16 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 337, 350
(1976).
143. Welfare and Institutions Code section 362(d) provides the court power to order
parents to "participate in child welfare services or services provided by an appropriate agency
designated by the court." Section 362(e) gives the court jurisdiction to require parents to "par-
ticipate in a counseling or education program. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 362(d)-(e)
(West 1984).
144. Id. at § 362(e).
145. Id.
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result in continued loss of the fundamental liberty interest in custody
of the child.14 If the therapy is court-ordered, the parent may not
prevent data garnered during therapy from being admitted at
trial.'4
7
In order to promote candor, settlements and the best interests of
the child through expedited judicial review, parents should be given
the same procedural protections against use of statements made dur-
ing negotiation and counseling that delinquent minors receive during
fitness hearings. Only then may parents fully cooperate in the state's
effort quickly to determine the best interests of the children.
2. Adult Plea Bargains in Criminal Cases
In People v. Harvey48 the defendant was charged with two
counts of robbery with use of a firearm and one count of an unre-
146. California Rules of Court 1335(a)(1) provides parents the privilege against self-
incrimination in dependency cases. Some probation officers equate a parent's silence in court-
ordered group-counseling sessions as equivalent to nonparticipation or uncooperativeness pur-
suant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.2(e). In one case, the probation officer
stated that when the mother attended court-ordered parenting classes, she did not participate,
but rather merely "would sit mute during discussions." The probation officer's conclusion was
that the parents "have not fully cooperated with the Department of Public School Services in
attending parenting classes, and when they have attended, they have received no apparent
benefits, because of their lack of participation." Clerk's Transcript, at 58-59 (copy on file at
WCSL).
147. See Collins v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 3d 47, 52-54, 141 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276-
77 (1977). If a court orders a psychotherapist to examine a defendant in order to provide
counsel information needed to advise defendant how to plead, the attorney-client privilege will
prevent introduction of defendant's statements made during therapy from being introduced at
trial. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1017 (West Supp. 1987); People v. Lines, 13 Cal. 3d 500, 507-12,
531 P.2d 793, 797-801, 119 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229-33 (1975). However, if the doctor or psycho-
therapist is appointed by the court to treat defendant, or to issue a report to the court instead
of to assist counsel, there is no attorney-client privilege. Once the defendant tenders his physi-
cal or mental condition into evidence, the results of the therapy or examination are no longer
protected by the physician-patient privilege or by the psychotherapist-patient privilege. CAL.
EvID. CODE § 996 (West 1966); City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.
2d 227, 238, 231 P.2d 26, 28 (1951); Lines, 13 Cal. 3d at 511-12, 531 P.2d at 800-01, 119
Cal. Rptr. at 232-33. However, since a parent ordered by the court to undergo therapy must
make a choice of invoking his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination or of suffer-
ing a presumption of parental unfitness pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section
366.2(e), several possible constitutional violations are involved. There may be a fifth amend-
ment violation under Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-68 (1981) (defendant's fifth amend-
ment privilege violated by admitting in the penalty phase statements made to a court-ordered
therapist for the purpose of determining whether defendant was mentally competent to stand
trial). Significant due process issues are also involved. Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.
3d 802, 807, 693 P.2d 789, 792, 210 Cal. Rptr. 204, 207 (1985); People v. Coleman, 13 Cal.
3d 867, 874-75, 533 P.2d 1024, 1031-32, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 391-92 (1975).
148. 25 Cal. 3d 754, 602 P.2d 396, 159 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1979).
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lated robbery. " 9 The defendant entered a guilty plea to two counts
of robbery with use of a firearm, and the third count was dismissed.
At the sentencing hearing, the court found the dismissed robbery
count described in the probation report was an aggravating circum-
stance and sentenced the defendant to the "upper" term of confine-
ment. The California Supreme Court held that the trial court erred
in using the dismissed plea bargained count at sentencing, because
"[ilmplicit in such a plea bargain, we think, is the understanding (in
the absence of any contrary agreement) that defendant will suffer no
adverse sentencing consequences by reason of the facts underlying,
and solely pertaining to, the dismissed count."' 50 Harvey "declares
an equitable rule applicable to negotiated pleas. The trial court can-
not with one hand give a benefit and with the other take it away."''
However, the Harvey rule does not apply to counts dismissed
pursuant to a plea bargain which are "transactionally related" to the
facts underlying the admitted counts."'5 2 In People v. Cortez,153 as
part of a plea bargain, the defendant pleaded guilty to robbery; a
related robbery. count and a dangerous weapon allegation were dis-
missed.' 4 At the sentencing hearing the trial court considered the
dismissed weapon use allegation and rendered an aggregated upper-
term sentence. The appellate court found no Harvey error because
the dismissed weapon use allegation was transactionally related to
the sustained robbery count in which defendant used the weapon. 
55
Further, in People v. Gaskill,'6 defendant pleaded guilty to unlaw-
ful possession of a sawed-off shotgun in exchange for dismissal of an
assault with a deadly weapon charge.' 57 The trial court's use of the
dismissed count in rendering the upper-term sentence was sustained
because possession and use of the weapon were transactionally re-
lated.' 58 In determining whether allegations are "transactionally re-
lated," courts have focused upon three variables: (1) the time span
between separate acts;' 59 (2) whether the separate acts involved dif-
149. Id. at 757, 602 P.2d at 397, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 697-98.
150. Id. at 758, 602 P.2d at 397-98, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
151. People v. Klaess, 129 Cal. App. 3d 820, 823, 181 Cal. Rptr. 355, 356 (1982).
152. Id.
153. 103 Cal. App. 3d 491, 163 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 496-97, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 3-4.
156. 110 Cal. App. 3d. 1, 167 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1980).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 4, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 550.
159. People v. Davis, 103 Cal. App. 3d 270, 280, 163 Cal. Rptr. 22, 29 (1980).
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ferent victims; 0 and (3) whether the acts involved "multiple crimi-
nal objectives which were independent of and not merely incidental
to each other. .... ,"161
Although Harvey has been extended to juveniles alleged to have
committed crimes in delinquency cases, Harvey has not been ex-
tended to dependency cases.16 2 Therefore, parents who admit or
plead nolo contendere to amended or dismissed petitions of child
abuse or neglect receive an illusory benefit. 1 3 There is no law to
prevent the juvenile court from considering at the disposition hearing
counts dismissed or amended pursuant to a plea bargain at the juris-
diction hearing. Therefore, the result of the parent's plea bargain is
that the court gains jurisdiction over the child, but all the data the
parents assumed had been dismissed can still be marshalled against
them.'1" No procedure exists to sanitize modified or dismissed counts
or the facts underlying those counts from probation reports which
the trial court is required to admit and consider."
If the probation officer determines that family reunification will
not be possible and refers the case for a parental severance trial,
nothing will prevent the social worker from including the stricken
factual basis of the amended or dismissed dependency allegations in
160. Harvey, 25 Cal. 3d at 757-59, 602 P.2d at 397-98, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 698-99.
161. People v. Guevara, 88 Cal. App. 3d 86, 90, 151 Cal. Rptr. 511, 514-15 (1979).
Guevara was a pre-Harvey case decided pursuant to Penal Code section 654 which provides:
An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different
provisions of this code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in
no case can it be punished under more than one; an acquittal or conviction and
sentence under either one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under
any other.
CAL. PENAl. CODE § 654 (West Supp. 1987).
162. In re Devin J., 155 Cal. App. 3d 1096, 1098, 202 Cal. Rptr. 543, 544 (1984).
163. "In lieu of admitting the allegations of the petition, the parent or guardian may
enter a no contest concerning the truth of the allegations, subject to approval of the court."
CAl.. R. Cr. 1364(e) (West 1987).
164. One must wonder why almost 80% of dependency cases result in negotiated settle-
ments if the parents do not benefit by amended or dismissed counts. One answer is that parents
do not receive competent counseling from their attorney. In four years of litigating dependency
cases through the trial advocacy course at UCLA Law School, I never heard a single attorney
completely explain the consequences of a nolo contendere plea. Further, although Rules ofCourt 1364(d) and (e) require court approval of admissions and nolo contendere pleas, and
although the court is required to inform parents of the consequences of the admission, I have
never heard a court inform parents about the use of modified or dismissed counts at the dispo-
sitional hearing.
165. "[Tlhe court shall receive in evidence the social study of the minor made by theprobation officer . . . and in any judgment and order of disposition, shall state the social study
made by the probation officer had been read and considered by the court." CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 358 (West 1984). The evidentiary nightmare parents face regarding the conse-
quences of section 358 is discussed infra, section III.
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the report for the severance trial.' 6" Therefore, the parents' initial
plea bargain does not protect them in the parental severance trial.
Finally, if criminal charges are filed, there is no law preventing the
prosecutor from using the parents' admissions or nolo contendere
pleas for impeachment.
67
Two changes are needed. First, People v. Harvey should be ap-
plied to dependency hearings. Any dismissed or amended count not
transactionally related to the nolo contendere plea and the facts un-
derlying those charges, should not be admissible at the dispositional
hearing, or any subsequent hearing based upon the underlying facts
of the sustained abuse or neglect petition. Second, probation officers
should not be permitted to include those modified or dismissed counts
and underlying facts in probation reports required to be considered
by the trial court in any proceeding.
The implementation of Harvey in dependency cases is not diffi-
cult. For example, consider the following hypothetical dependency
petition:
Paragraph I, Subdivision A and D: Said minor has no parent
and/or guardian capable of and actually exercising proper care
and control, in that: minors normally reside in the home of par-
ents and:
Count I: On or about January 22, 1986, minor Autumn was
hospitalized suffering a detrimental condition of malnutrition
and/or failure to thrive while in the custody and control of
parents;
Count II: Parents have demonstrated numerous emotional and
mental problems, and because of their limitations, are unable to
properly care for minors;
Count III: On or about March 10, 1986, minor's father en-
gaged in acts of sexual intercourse with minor Autumn. Four-
year-old sibling, Tommy, inadvertently saw the father and Au-
tumn during intercourse. As a result, neither minor has a par-
ent or guardian capable of and actually exercising proper and
effective parental care and control;
Count IV: Minor's father was convicted of a felony, robbery, in
violation of Penal Code section 211, on May 7, 1978, and is
166. The probation officer is required to file a report concerning a recommendation for
the proper disposition of the Civil Code section 232 parental severance petition. CAL. CIv.
CODE § 233 (West 1982). The court "shall receive the report in evidence and shall read and
consider the contents thereof in rendering its judgment." CAL. CIv. CODE § 233(d) (West
1982). See also In re George G., 68 Cal. App. 3d 146, 137 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1977).
167. Rules of Court 1364(e) merely precludes use of the no contest plea "as an admis-
sion in any other action or proceeding." CAL. R. CT. 1364(e) (West 1987).
[Vol. 27
1987] DEPENDENCY AND PARENTAL SEVERANCE 331
thus unfit to care for minors.
Suppose that at the jurisdictional hearing the parents plead nolo
contendere to Count III, sexual intercourse with Autumn in the
presence of Tommy, in exchange for the dismissal of all other
counts. What facts underlying the dismissed counts would be admis-
sible under Harvey at the disposition hearing?
Count I involves the same victim as Count III, but there was a
two-and-a-half-month period between the events which involved
completely different elements under the Penal Code definitions of
those crimes. Therefore, under Harvey the relationship to the admit-
ted count is tenuous, not transactionally related, and that evidence
should be excluded.
Count II alleges that the parents' mental and emotional
problems prevent proper parenting for the children. In a broad
sense, mental and emotional abnormality may be related to the cir-
cumstances, state of mind, or intent of the father regarding the ad-
mitted Count III, sexual intercourse with Autumn. Further, since
mental and emotional status may be a continuing condition, the vari-
able of temporal nexus between the counts may be present. Thus, it
appears that Count II may be transactionally related to Count III.
However, it is clear that the mother's mental or psychological status
has no direct correlation with Count III, and that data should' be
excluded under Harvey. There was no allegation that the mother
knew of the father's potential to molest Autumn.
But courts must be very cautious in admitting evidence of par-
ent's mental or emotional problems. An easy generalization is that
''only a psychologically sick parent would harm his or her child,"
and therefore the parents' mental status is always transactionally re-
lated to counts of alleged abuse or neglect. However, the Legislature
specifically created separate sections covering parents' inability to
care for children based upon mental instability. Welfare and Institu-
tions Code section 300(c) provides for court jurisdiction if the parent
is "physically dangerous to the public because of mental or physical
deficiency, disorder or abnormality."1 ' Also, Civil Code section
232(a)(6) provides for parental severance if the parents "are men-
tally disabled and are likely to remain so in the foreseeable fu-
ture."169 But the Legislature has set rigorous proof requirements for
parental severance based upon mental unfitness. The evidence must
not only be relevant, the prosecutor must also introduce evidence by
168. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(c) (West Supp. 1987).
169. CAL. CIv. CODE § 232(a)(6) (West 1982).
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two certified medical experts to support a finding of parental mental
incompetence.
1 70
Count IV involves a different victim, a different intent, different
elements and is extremely remote. There is nothing to support a
finding that Count IV is "transactionally related" to the admitted
Count III, and therefore, the evidence should be inadmissible at the
dispositional hearing.
The Harvey "transactionally related" test is thus easy to apply
to child dependency cases. This test promotes settlements which are
consistent with the policy of stabilizing the minor's life expeditiously
and protects the parents' benefit of the plea bargain by assuring that
amended or dismissed counts, and their underlying facts, will not
affect the disposition of the dependency action.
B. Dependency Trial Testimony
California courts have struggled for more than a decade with
the effects of subsequent or collateral proceedings upon the scope of
the privilege against self-incrimination. 17 1 Of cases where the privi-
lege against self-incrimination is surrendered in order to assert a
different constitutional right, the least judicial attention and narrow-
est constitutional protection involves parents in dependency and pa-
rental severance trials. That inattention ironically results from the
presence of an applicable statute, Welfare and Institutions Code sec-
tion 355.7 which provides: "Testimony by a parent, guardian, or
other person who has the care or custody of the minor made the
subject of a proceeding under subdivision (a) or (d) of Section 300
shall not be admissible as evidence in any other action or proceed-
ing."' 2  However, several questions immediately arise: (1) does sec-
tion 355.7 provide use, transactional, or derivative immunity; (2)
does the immunity extend to parents' pre-trial statements contained
170. Civil Code section 232(a)(6) requires that:
[Thel evidence of any two experts, each of whom shall be either a physician or
surgeon, certified either by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology or
under section 6750 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, or a licensed psycholo-
gist who has a doctoral degree in psychology and at least five years of post-
graduate experience in the diagnosis and treatment of emotional and mental
disorders, shall be required to support a finding [of parental unfitness based
upon parental mental disability].
CAL.. Civ. CoDn: I 2321(a)(6) (West 1982).
171. People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1975); In
re Wayne H., 24 Cal. 3d 595, 596 P.2d 1, 156 Cal. Rptr. 344 (1979); People v. Weaver, 39
Cal. 3d 654, 703 P.2d 1139, 217 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1985).
172. CAL.. WFI.F. & INST. CODE § 355.7 (West Supp. 1987).
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in official documents introduced in the dependency trial; (3) may
parents' testimony be used as impeachment in subsequent parental
severance or criminal proceedings; and (4) does section 355.7 immu-
nity survive the "truth in evidence" provisions of California Consti-
tution article 1, section 28(d)?...
Although parents in dependency cases, like other civil litigants
facing possible criminal charges, have a privilege against self-incrim-
ination, 4 it has been held that because of the immunity afforded by
California Welfare and Institutions Code section 355.7, s7 the court
can order the parent to testify without admonishing the parent of her
privilege against self-incrimination. 76 At first blush, section 355.7
appears to provide parents minimal protection since it is specifically
limited to testimony, not to evidence in general. Testimony in Cali-
fornia merely includes "evidence which comes from living witnesses
who testify orally" under oath in court.' 7  However, section 355.7
provides use immunity of oral testimony. 78 Section 355.7 does not
cover pre-trial statements made by the parents to officials such as the
173. Article 1, section 28(d) of the California Constitution provides,
Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of member-
ship in each house of the legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in
any criminal proceeding . . . whether heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing
in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to
privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, sections 352, 782, or 1103.
CAL. CONSi. art. 1, § 28(d).
174. The court is only required to "inform the parent or guardian of... Itihe right to
assert the privilege against self-incrimination." CAL. R. CT. 1335(c)(1) (West 1987).
175. If the trial court grants immunity to a parent and requires the parent to answer aquestion, and the parent would have been privileged to remain silent, "any answer given,
evidence produced, or any information derived therefrom shall not be used against the witnessin any juvenile court or criminal proceeding." CAL. R. CT. 1342(d) (West 1987). The useimmunity for dependency proceedings contrasts sharply with the transactional immunity pro-
vided witnesses in Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 juvenile delinquency trials pursu-
ant to Rules of Court 1342(c), where the witness "shall not be subject to proceedings under thejuvenile court law, to criminal prosecution, or to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of
any fact or act concerning which, in accordance with the order [to testify], the witness was
required to answer or produce evidence." CAL. R. CT. 1342(c) (West 1987).
176. In In re Amos L., 124 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 177 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1981), the court
determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the mother to testify
since "testimony by a parent in a section 300 proceeding is specifically prohibited from being
admitted as evidence in any other action or proceeding." Id. at 1039, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
See also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.7 (West 1984).
177. Mann v. Higgins, 83 Cal. 66, 69, 23 P. 206, 207 (1890); People v. Lee, 164 Cal.App. 3d 830, 840-41, 210 Cal. Rptr. 799, 805-06 (1985). "Evidence" is defined as "testimony,
writings, material objects, or other things presented to the senses that are offered to prove the
existence or nonexistence of a fact." CAt.. EVID. CODE § 140 (West 1987). "Every witnessbefore testifying shall take an oath or make an affirmation or declaration in the form provided
by law." CAL. EVID. CODE § 710 (West 1966).
178. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.7 (West 1984).
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probation officer, police or prosecutors which are admitted at trial
through the probation officer's reports since those statements are not
"testimony."
If section 355.7 is the sole protection for parents ordered by the
court to testify, the parents are only partially protected. For exam-
ple, once the parent is on the witness stand, what is the legal effect
of a parent refusing to answer the following question: "Isn't it true,
Mr. Smith, that you told the probation officer that you 'just don't
have the foggiest idea how to take care of your child?' " Can the
juvenile dependency court draw a negative inference from the par-
ent's silence and conclude that Mr. Smith did in fact admit that he
did not know how to parent? In a recent Massachusetts case,
Custody of Two Minors,179 the court held that the privilege against
self-incrimination in criminal proceedings, which prevents drawing a
negative inference from defendant's failure to testify, was not appli-
cable in a child custody case. 180
If a parent's refusal to answer a question regarding pre-trial
statements can be used against the parent during the dependency
trial or in subsequent trials, then section 355.7 does not provide the
same scope of protection as California Constitution article I, section
15.181 In order to pass constitutional muster, use immunity must
provide the "same scope and effect" as the privilege against self-in-
crimination. 82 Therefore, under certain circumstances section 355.7
may be unconstitutional as applied, since it does not fully cover the
scope of parents' privilege against self-incrimination. Because rules
of construction favor interpretation sustaining the constitutionality of
statutes, the best analysis supports a finding that section 355.7 is
only one protection of parents' self-incrimination rights.183
California Evidence Code section 940 does not define the scope
of the privilege against self-incrimination, but rather provides that
the privilege is co-extensive with the scope under "the Constitution
of the United States or the State of California. . ". ." " Rule
1365(c) of the California Rules of Court states: "[e]xcept as provided
in sections 355.1 through 355.7, the admission and exclusion of evi-
179. 487 N.E.2d 1358, 396 Mass. 61(0 (1986).
180. Id.
181. CAl.. CONs'r. art. 1, § 15. The state privilege against self-incrimination, applies to
ordinary civil cases. See also Fross v. Wotton, 3 Cal. 2d 384, 393, 44 P.2d 350, 354 (1935).
182. Byers v. Justice Court, 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 1049, 458 P.2d 465, 472, 80 Cal. Rptr.
553, 560 (1969); see also Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968).
183. See In re Determination of Rights to Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System,
25 Cal. 3d 339, 599 P.2d 656, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1979).
184. CAI.. EvID. CODE § 940 (West 1966).
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dence shall be in accordance with the rules of evidence established by
the Evidence Code and by judicial decision." '85 Clearly, the Legisla-
ture could not have meant that Welfare and Institutions Code section
355.7 supplants Evidence Code section 940 by providing narrower
protection under the privilege against self-incrimination than is com-
pelled by the United States or California Constitutions. Therefore,
the only logical conclusion is that the Legislature in drafting section
355.7 intended to provide more protection than was currently man-
dated by the constitution, judicial opinions, or Evidence Code section
940.
That "protection-plus" of Welfare and Institutions Code section
355.7 appears to be a total bar to the introduction of parents' depen-
dency testimony "in any other action or proceeding" even for the
purpose of impeachment. That protection exceeds the scope of crimi-
nal defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. In People v.
Coleman, 8 the defendant argued that a probation revocation hear-
ing preceding a criminal trial based upon the same underlying facts,
denied him procedural due process by forcing him not to testify at
the revocation hearing in order to avoid incriminating himself at the
criminal trial. 187 The California Supreme Court fashioned a judi-
cially declared rule of evidence: upon objection, the defendant's testi-
mony at the probation revocation hearing and any evidence derived
therefrom will be inadmissible in the subsequent criminal proceed-
ings, except for "impeachment or rebuttal where the probationer's
revocation hearing testimony or evidence derived therefrom and his
testimony on direct examination at the criminal proceeding are so
clearly inconsistent as to warrant the trial court's admission of the
revocation hearing testimony . . . to reveal . . . the probability that
the probationer has committed perjury .. ."88 Further, in Sheila
0. v. Superior Court,'89 it was similarly held that except for pur-
poses of impeachment, testimony by a juvenile at a fitness hearing
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) is inadmis-
sible at the jurisdictional hearing.' 90
185. CAl.. R. C'r. 1365(c) (West 1987).
186. 13 Cal. 3d 867, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1975).
187. Id. at 889, 533 P.2d at 1042, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
188. Id.
189. 125 Cal. App. 3d 812, 178 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1981).
190. Id. at 816-17, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 420. The California Supreme Court in Ramona
R. v. Superior Court stated, "[wle do not here reach the question whether the testimony [of ajuvenile at at fitness hearing] may be used for purposes of impeachment. This dictum in Shiela[sic] 0. is thus neither approved nor disapproved." 37 Cal. 3d 802, 807 n.2, 693 P.2d 789,
792 n.2, 210 Cal. Rptr. 204, 207 n.2 (1985).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Thus, a court can only compel parents to testify in dependency
hearings, based upon section 355.7 use immunity, by ruling that a
parent's silence or refusal to answer questions regarding pre-trial
statements, based upon the privilege against self-incrimination, may
not be used against the parent in the dependency trial or any subse-
quent trial. 9 Statutory rules of construction support the holding
that the Legislature intended section 355.7 to supplant the California
Evidence Code section 940 privilege against self-incrimination solely
in the area of "testimonial" use immunity. All other areas of appli-
cability of the privilege against self-incrimination are covered by the
federal and state constitutions.
The remaining question is whether Welfare and Institutions
Code section 355.7 survived the "truth in evidence" provision of Cal-
ifornia Constitution article I, section 28(d). That provision requires
introduction of relevant evidence in criminal trials unless excluded
by "any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or
hearsay, or Evidence Code, sections 352, 782, or 1103. '92 Since sec-
tion 355.7 expressly prohibits the use of parents' testimony, and
since courts have held that section 355.7 was an equivalent of the
privilege against self-incrimination, that statute clearly survived arti-
cle I, section 28(d). 93
IV. THE PARAMETERS OF ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE IN PROBA-
TION REPORTS PREPARED FOR DEPENDENCY AND PARENTAL
SEVERANCE TRIALS
The California Rules of Evidence and Rules of Court are ap-
191. In re Amos L., 124 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 1039, 177 Cal. Rptr. 783, 791 (1981). The
narrow definition of Welfare and Institutions Code section 355.7 immunity which is limited to
"testimony" contrasts sharply with the protection under Evidence Code section 940 which in-
cludes pre-trial out-of-court statements as well. In People v. Barrios, the court stated that
"[w]e particularly note the court's conclusion [in Ramona R.1 that statements made to a proba-
tion officer [by a juvenile charged in a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition] are
included within the privilege even though they are not testimonial when made. 166 Cal.
App. 3d 732, 747, 212 Cal. Rptr. 644, 653 (1985).
192. CAl.. CONS'. art. I, § 28(d).
193. The issue of whether the use immunity under Coleman for probation revocation
hearings, and Bryan, In re Wayne H., and Sheila 0. for juveniles' statements to probation
officers and at fitness hearings survived article I, section 28(d) of the California Constitution
was a bit more complicated since Evidence Code section 940 did not explicitly refer to use
immunities. However, the California Supreme Court in Ramona R., 37 Cal. 3d at 808, 693
P.2d at 793, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 208, held that the language of Evidence Code section 940 "is
purposefully broad, and is meant to include within its reach judicial decisions relating to the
privilege against self-incrimination." See also People v. Weaver, 39 Cal. 3d 654, 659-60, 703
P.2d 1139, 1142-43, 217 Cal. Rptr. 245, 248-49 (1985).
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plicable to dependency and parental severance cases."" However,
several statutes and cases have specifically defined evidentiary excep-
tions which permit the court considerably more latitude in
considering evidence than in a normal civil case. Clearly, the catch-
all evidentiary document in both dependency and parental severance
trials is the probation report which the court is required to admit
and consider. 9 '
A. Welfare and Institutions Code Section 300 Dependency Cases
The probation officer is required to investigate and issue a writ-
ten report concerning the custody, status and welfare of children in-
volved in dependency court.1" At the jurisdictional dependency hear-
ing, the court determines whether the minor should be a dependent
child under court jurisdiction. California Welfare and Institutions
Code section 355 permits the court to consider "any matter or infor-
mation relevant and material to circumstances or acts which are al-
leged to bring [the child] within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court. .... ",197 The scheme is therefore clear. The trial court at thejurisdictional hearing may admit and consider relevant and material
evidence contained in the probation report unless judicial decisions
have created exceptions.
The Evidence Code defines relevant evidence as that which has
"any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that
is of consequence to the . . .action."' 8 It is not enough that evi-
dence is merely "of consequence," it further must tend to prove or
disprove a disputed fact."" If the parties take an issue out of dispute,
194. "Except as provided in sections 355.1 through 355.7, the admission and exclusion
of evidence shall be in accordance with the rules of evidence established by the Evidence Code
and by judicial decision." CAL. R. CT. 1365(c) (West 1987). See In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal.
App. 3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1984).
195. Both Welfare and Institutions Code section 358 and Civil Code section 233 require
the court to admit and consider the probation officer's report.
196. "It shall be the duty of the probation officer to prepare for every hearing on thedisposition of a case . . .a social study of the minor, containing such matters as may be
relevant to a proper disposition of the case." CAL. WELF. & INsr. CODE § 280 (West 1984).
Moreover, "Ithe probation officer shall upon order of any court in any matter involving cus-tody, status, or welfare of a minor or minors, make an investigation of appropriate facts and
circumstances and prepare and file with the court written reports and written recommenda-
tions in reference to such matters." Id. § 281.
197. The Rules of Court provide that "[a] probation or social worker's report, including
any social study, containing information relevant and material to the jurisdiction hearing is
admissible .... CAL. R. CT. 1365(d) (West 1987).
198. CAL.. EvID. CODE § 210 (West 1966).
199. Id. See also People v. Hall, 28 Cal. 3d 143, 616 P.2d 826, 167 Cal. Rptr. 844(1980).
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all evidence on that issue is irrelevant and inadmissible. 200 Further,
evidence which is not pertinent to the issues raised by the pleadings
is immaterial and should not be introduced. A court has no authority
to admit or judicially notice irrelevant evidence.20'
Therefore, absent questions concerning the constitutional right
to confront hearsay declarants and the proscription against admitting
or considering irrelevant evidence, the trial court has broad discre-
tion in considering the probation report. Even though Welfare and
Institutions Code section 358 requires the court to receive and con-
sider the probation report, section 355, like sections 210 and 350,
limits consideration to relevant and material evidence.20 2 However,
unless a procedure exists to sanitize the probation report of irrele-
vant prejudicial data before the trial judge reads the report, the judge
must necessarily violate the above code sections. Currently no proce-
dure exists to sanitize probation reports before the trial judge reads
them. County counsel and the district attorney who represent the
state in dependency trials often argue that there is no right to sani-
tize the report. 03 In fact, trial judges often read the probation re-
ports before counsel has an opportunity to move to exclude irrelevant
and prejudicial information. 04
200. Hall, 28 Cal. 3d at 152, 616 P.2d at 831, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 849; People v. Reyes
62 Cal. App. 3d 53, 64-68, 132 Cal. Rptr. 848, 856-58 (1976); Fuentes v. Tucker, 31 Cal. 2d
1, 4-5, 187 P.2d 752, 754 (1947).
201. The Evidence Code provides, "Injo evidence is admissible except relevant evi-
dence." CAi.. EVID. CODE § 350 (West 1966). See also People v. Woodard, 23 Cal. 3d 329,
590 P.2d 391, 152 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1979); Mozzetti v. City of Brisbane, 67 Cal. App. 3d 565,
577-78, 136 Cal. Rptr. 751, 758-59 (1977).
202. CAl.. WLt.F. & INST. CODE § 355 (West 1984).
203. Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 351, county counsel or the Dis-
trict Attorney shall represent the child and state. In one case I litigated for the U.C.L.A.
clinical program, county counsel argued that "[tihere is no legal authority to 'sanitize' a legally
mandated probation report .. " Reply Brief for Appellant at 14 (on file at the WCSL Li-
brary). The trial court denied the motion to sanitize the report and further stated "I want all
possible information I can have on something like that [the child neglect allegations]. This is a
very serious matter. If I can get more information, I want more information. . . .I want all
the information I can have in a situation of this type." Record at 149-50 (on file at the WCSL
Library).
204. In one Los Angeles Superior Court parental severance case under Civil Code sec-
tion 232, which I supervised at U.C.L.A. Law School, county counsel requested the court to
take judicial notice of the entire juvenile court file, containing among numerous other docu-
ments, the Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 Probation Report. The court responded,
"[yles, I have read both the files and they will be received into evidence." Record at 20 (on file
at the WCSL Library). The court in In re Biggs, 17 Cal. App. 3d 337,344, 94 Cal. Rptr.
519, 523 (1971), held that it was not error for the court to read the probation report prior to
the jurisdiction hearing. See also In re Courtney S., 130 Cal. App. 3d 567, 575, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 843, 848 (1982).
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B. Civil Code Section 232 Parental Severance Trials
After a child has been declared a dependent child of the supe-
rior court for at least one year, a Permanency Planning hearing must
be held to determine whether a parental severance trial should be
initiated."0 5 As discussed earlier, a probation report is also required
in parental severance cases. Civil Code section 233 requires the pro-
bation officer to file a written report with a dispositional recommen-
dation, which the court "shall read and consider . . . in rendering its
decision."206
Unlike dependency trials, which statutorily limit consideration
to relevant evidence, the Civil Code contains no such limitation in
parental severance trials. 207 Therefore, Evidence Code sections 210
and 352 control the scope of admissible evidence in parental sever-
ance trials.208 However, relevancy has been very broadly construed
in relation to data contained in a Civil Code section 232 probation
report.2"9
There are two reasons why California Evidence Code sections
210, 350 and 352 apply to Civil Code section 233 probation reports.
First, unless otherwise provided by statute, the Evidence Code ap-
plies to all superior court proceedings. 210 Second, there is no statute
which exempts section 232 probation reports from the Evidence
Code proscriptions. In People v. Beagle,211 the California Supreme
Court was to determine whether Evidence Code section 352 permit-
ted trial court discretion to excuse unduly prejudicial evidence of a
defendant's prior felony conviction which was otherwise admissible
pursuant to California Evidence Code section 788.22 Beagle held
that section 352 was "one of the 'general provisions' of the Evidence
Code . . . which apply to evidence admissible under other provisions
thereof."213 Beagle, therefore, ruled that section 352 permitted the
court discretion to exclude evidence of prior felony convictions. In a
205. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.25(a), (d) (West Supp. 1987).
206. CAL. CIv. CODE § 233 (West 1982).
207. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355 (West 1984); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 232-39 (West
1982).
208. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 210, 350 (West 1966).
209. In re Rose Lynn G. held that Civil Code section 232 does not limit information in
the probation report to statements of the probation officer's personal knowledge. 57 Cal. App.
3d 406, 426, 129 Cal. Rptr. 338, 350 (1976).
210. CAL. EVID. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1987).
211. 6 Cal. 3d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972).
212. Id. at 452-53, 492 P.2d at 7-8, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 319-20; CAL. EVID. CODE § 352(West 1966).
213. 6 Cal. 3d at 452, 492 P.2d at 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
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subsequent case, the California Supreme Court clarified its ruling in
Beagle and stated that if the Legislature had intended an exception
to the applicability of the "general provisions" of the Evidence Code,
"it would have said so forthrightly."214
Civil Code section 233 presents an analogous problem since the
Legislature did not expressly state that the "general provisions" of
Evidence Code sections 210, 350 and 352 were inapplicable in pa-
rental severance trials. Therefore, as in Woodard, the Evidence Code
definitions of relevance are applicable to section 233 probation re-
ports. Consideration of that irrelevant evidence is error. However,
there is a world of procedural difference between harmless error and
prejudicial error, and that distinction historically has prevented an
adequate remedy for parties in dependency and parental severance
court trials. There is a longstanding assumption that trial judges dis-
regard evidence later determined irrelevant by an appellate court.2 15
Of course, unless the judge specifically states on the record that she
did not consider the inadmissible evidence, conjecture and specula-
tion formulated as a presumption of official duty will prevail; the
judge would not have considered evidence which should not have
been admitted, and even if she did, it did not prejudice her decision.
California Courts for years have disapproved the presumption
of nonprejudicial error in court trials. In Estate of James,2 16 the
court stated:
If improper evidence under objection has been admitted, it is
impossible for this court to say how much weight and influence
it had in the mind of the trial court in framing its findings of
214. People v. Woodard, 23 Cal. 3d 329, 336 n.4, 590 P.2d 391, 394-95 n.4, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 536, 539-40 n.4 (1979).
215. In Gimbel v. Laramie, 181 Cal. App. 2d 77, 5 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1960), the court
stated that:
From the very nature of the office he occupies and of the judicial processes a
judge is required to divorce from his mind many inadmissible matters which are
inevitably brought to light during the course of a trial. Improper incidents occur
which cannot be guarded against. The law does not assume prejudice on the
part of the trial judge. To justify a mistrial, a new trial or a reversal on appeal,
an affirmative showing of prejudice ...is required.
Id. at 84, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 92-93. See also People v. Beaumaster, 17 Cal. App. 3d 996, 1009, 95
Cal. Rptr. 360, 369 (1971). But the remedy of appeal is inadequate in dependency and paren-
tal severance cases because the longer the child is separated from its parents, the greater the
chances that the family will not be reunited. The court may conclude that the months or years
of separation from the natural parents have resulted in a psychological bonding between the
minor and his foster parents or adoptive parents. The court may also conclude that the minor
should not be returned to the natural parents because it would cause the child too much
trauma. See In re Adoption of Pierce, 5 Cal. App. 3d at 320, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
216. 124 Cal. App. 3d 653, 177 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1981).
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fact. The improperly admitted evidence may have been all-pow-
erful to that effect. As far as this court knows it may have been
that particular evidence which turned the scale and lost the case
for the appellants. This must of necessity be the rule wherever
improper evidence has been admitted which upon its face tends
in any degree to affect the final conclusion of the court.21 7
The court has eschewed the distinction between jury and court trials.
In addition, the California Supreme Court has disapproved of the
notion that: "As the trial was before the court and not before a jury,
it is patent that immaterial testimony could do no harm. .. "28
There is no accurate means of determining the effect of improperly
admitted evidence on the trial court's conclusions.2 ' In dependency
and parental severance cases, absent an express statement by the
court on the record, it should be presumed the court considered all
evidence in the probation reports as mandated by Welfare and Insti-
tutions Code section 358 and Civil Code section 233.
C. Evidence Concerning Uncharged Allegations
In both dependency and parental severance trials, the parents'
due process rights require advance notice of the state's allegations, 220
and they have a statutory right to a copy of the petitions.22" ' Further,
the exclusive grounds for severing parental relationships are listed in
Civil Code section 232.222 The state may not rely at trial on a statu-
tory ground for severance not charged in the petition.228
Since the grounds alleged in the petition dictate the contested
issues, they also circumscribe the scope of relevant evidence pursuant
to California Evidence Code sections 210 and 350.224 Evidence
which does not relate to the statutory grounds alleged in the petition
is irrelevant because it is not germane to "prove or disprove any dis-
puted fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
217. Id. at 655, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
218. C.O. Bashaw v. Wood & Stevens, Inc., 72 Cal. App. 94, 236 P. 346 (1925).
219. Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Ingersoll, 153 Cal. 1, 9, 94 P. 94 (1908).
220. In re Neal D., 23 Cal. App. 3d 1045, 1048, 100 Cal. Rptr. 706, 709 (1972); In re
Dunlap, 62 Cal. App. 3d 428, 133.Cal. Rptr. 310 (1976).
221. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 311, 336(d) (West 1984); CAL. CIV. CODE §§
233.5, 235 (West 1982).
222. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232 (West 1982); In re Dunlap, 62 Cal. App. 3d at 437, 133
Cal. Rptr. at 315.
223. Dunlap, 62 Cal. App. 3d at 440, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 317.
224. Evidence Code section 210 provides, "relevant evidence [is] evidence ... having a
tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determi-
nation of the action." CAL. EvIo. CODE § 210 (West 1966). Moreover, "no evidence is admis-
sible except relevant evidence." Id. at § 350.
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action.""" 5
However, many trial courts currently hold that since probation
reports are admissible and must be considered, even facts which are
not pertinent to the allegations must be admitted. In one recent trial,
the court refused to sanitize hearsay evidence concerning the parents'
emotional and mental health even though the state had not alleged
the parents' mental and emotional incapacity to care for the child
pursuant to California Civil Code section 232(a)(6) 2 6 The court of
appeal, in a startlingly expansive definition of relevance, held that
there was no error because "the trial court in a Civil Code section
232 proceeding must act in the best interests of the child. From this
we conclude that the information appellants contend is irrelevant -
appellant's emotional and mental health - has bearing in a parental
rights severance proceeding.. 2
The court's analysis and definition of relevance is incorrect for
several reasons. First, the Evidence Code defines relevant evidence,
not in terms of the best interests of the child, but rather in terms of
evidence germane to issues in dispute. 28 Second, Civil Code section
232(a)(6) was not alleged in the petition; the parents were not pro-
vided due process notice of the evidence and charges to be used
against them."2 9 Third, if parents cannot delete evidence of un-
charged allegations of mental incompetency from probation reports,
the state will indirectly violate Civil Code section 232(a)(6). That
section requires the testimony of two board certified doctors or two
licensed, statutorily qualified psychologists to support a finding of
parental mental incompetence. 280 Further, McLaughlin v. Superior
Court l ' held that probation officers and investigators in child cus-
tody proceedings must testify "subject to the rules of evidence. 2..2
Again, the Legislature could not have intended irrelevant prejudicial
evidence of parental mental instability to be included in a probation
report which would be inadmissible at trial through the probation
225. CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (West 1966).
226. The documents in the court file contained the following multiple hearsay: (1) the
mother was hospitalized for six months at the age of 18 and later spent two weeks at Norwalk
Metropolitan State Hospital; and (2) the "parents have a history of mental and emotional
problems .. " Clerk's Transcript at 54-55, 58 (on file at the WCSL Library).
227. Unpublished appellate opinion, at 11-12 (on file at the WCSL Library).
228. See supra section III, A and B.
229. Dunlap, 62 Cal. App. 3d at 440, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 317.
230. CAL. CIv. CODE § 232(a)(6) (West 1982).
231. 140 Cal. App. 3d 473, 189 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1983).
232. Id. at 481, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
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officer's live testimony." 8 Finally, the rule of statutory construction
that specific provisions control general provisions applies here. Sec-
tion 233 is a general rule of admissibility of evidence contained in a
probation report. However, section 232(a)(6) is a specific evidentiary
exception to section 233. Section 232(a)(6) sets special requirements
for the introduction of evidence of parental mental incapacity.
In short, the Legislature could not have intended statutorily in-
adequate evidence concerning parental mental incapacity on un-
charged allegations, which could not be admitted through live testi-
mony, to be considered by the trial judge just because the evidence
appears in the probation report.23 4 The Legislature never intended
to give the state a vehicle for introducing evidence insufficient under
section 232(a)(6) via the section 233 exception.
D. Prior Arrests and Convictions
Civil Code section 232(a)(4) provides that if the parent is con-
victed of a felony based on facts which demonstrate the parent's un-
fitness to care for the child, the trial court may sustain the severance
petition. 85 The felony conviction is admissible because it is relevant
to proving the contested allegation. However, in addition to prior
felony convictions, probation reports routinely contain both substan-
tiated and unsubstantiated arrest report data.'"
Evidence of arrests, especially when there is no disposition of
the case, indicates but a single conclusion: a citizen or police officer
subjectively believed both that a crime was committed or was about
to be committed, and that the accused was probably connected with
the crime.23 7 An arrest does not indicate guilt or inability to care for
one's child. An arrest has no tendency to prove any of the Civil Code
section 232 grounds for parental severance and therefore is irrelevant
pursuant to California Evidence Code sections 210 and 350. Since
arrests do not have probative value regarding the credibility of a wit-
ness, they are not admissible as impeachment evidence pursuant to
233. One of the lynchpins of jurisprudence is that "no man can do indirectly that which
he is forbidden to do directly." Bird v. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628, 130 Eng. Rep. 911 (1825);
People v. Bentley, 131 Cal. App. 2d 687, 691, 281 P.2d 1, 3 (1955).
234. Frequently the probation officer attaches doctors' reports and/or police reports to
the probation reports prepared pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 281 and
Civil Code section 232. See In re James B., 166 Cal. App. 3d 934, 212 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1985).
However, nothing in the statutes authorizes the attachment of such reports.
235. CAL. CIv. CODE § 232(a)(4) (West 1982).
236. In re Rose Lynn G., 57 Cal. App. 3d 406, 425-26, 129 Cal. Rptr. 338, 350
(1976).
237. CAl.. PENAL CODE §§ 836, 836.5, 837 (West 1985).
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California Evidence Code section 788. " Additionally, California
Evidence Code section 787 expressly precludes attacking a witness'
credibility by showing prior arrests.2"9
Even so, the court in In re Rose Lynn G.2 40 held that there was
no error in admitting an arrest sheet. The court noted that
"[elvidence of a parent's conviction of a crime would appear to have
some relevancy in determining the best interests of children of such a
parent, while evidence of arrests would appear, at best, to have little
or no relevancy. '"241
In re Rose Lynn G. is incorrectly decided. It is inconsistent with
Evidence Code sections 210, 350, 787 and 788. Even if prior arrests
have "little or no relevancy," the probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the prejudicial impact, and should be excluded under
Evidence Code section 352."22
E. The Relationship Between Foster Parents and/or Prospective
Adoptive Parents and the Child
It was clear in California for over a quarter of a century that
evidence of the minor's adjustment in foster placement was inadmis-
sible in a parental severance trial. The court in In re Zimmerman 4 "
stated that such testimony "was not relevant or material to the issues
before the court below, which was the depravity of the respondent
[parent] and whether her conduct towards [the minor] at the time of
238. CAl,. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1966).
239. Id. at § 787; Grudt v. City of L.A., 2 Cal. 3d 575, 591-93, 468 P.2d 825, 832-33,
86 Cal. Rptr. 465, 472-74 (1970); Monroe v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 114 Cal. App. 3d
804, 810, 170 Cal. Rptr. 867, 869 (1981). The adult criminal cases which have not found
reversible error from the introduction of prior arrest reports involved sentencing hearings, not
guilt-phase trials; thus, the arrest reports did not color the factual determination of guilt. See
Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859, 867-68, 553 P.2d 624, 629-31, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464,
468-70 (1976); People v. Chi Ko Wong, 18 Cal. 3d 698, 719, 557 P.2d 976, 988-89, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 392, 406 (1976); People v. Herron, 62 Cal. App. 3d 643, 646, 133 Cal. Rptr. 287, 289
(1976). Therefore, criminal law cases argue against admitting raw arrest data at the jurisdic-
tional hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, or in a trial as provided
by Civil Code section 232. See also People v. Taylor, 92 Cal. App. 3d 831, 833 n.1, 155 Cal.
Rptr. 62, 63 n.1 (1979).
240. 57 Cal. App. 3d 406, 129 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1976).
241. Id. at 425-26, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
242. In one appeal I filed, the court of appeal relied on In re Rose Lynn G. in holding
that admission and consideration of the twenty unsubstantiated arrests was not error. The
court further stated, "[iun light of the fact that the information about the arrests was part of
the report, we find no error in its admission." Reporter's Transcripts at 12 (on file at the
WCSL Library).
243. 206 Cal. App. 2d 835, 24 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1962).
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the hearing was such as to require the severence of parental ties.''2"
However, prosecutors argue that In re Zimmerman was preempted
by California Civil Code section 232.5, which provides: "[t]he provi-
sions of this chapter shall be liberally construed to serve and protect
the interests and welfare of the child."'2 40 But, section 232.5 merely
states that the best interests of the child should be considered and
therefore does not affect the vitality of In re Zimmerman. It does not
abrogate the parents' due process rights and does not state that the
Evidence Code's definition of relevance is inapplicable in a parental
severence trial. Further, in Adoption of D.S.C., the court held that
the "liberal construction" language of section 232.5 was not intended
to affect the fundamental right of parenting: "[tihus, in determining
whether the legal relationship between child and natural parent
should be severed, the right of parenting is not to be subordinated to
the best interests of the child. 241 6 Finally, In re Zimmerman ex-
pressly stated that the court must not only consider the fitness of the
parent, but must also consider the best interest of the child. Quoting
from In re Melkonian,4 7 the Zimmerman court stated: "[t]he in-
quiry under this statute is similar to that under the guardianship
statute, the fitness or unfitness of the parent and the best interest of
the child." ' 48 The Zimmerman court's decision to exclude evidence of
the child/foster parent relationship was based upon the identical fac-
tors which must currently be considered under section 232.5 and
Adoption of D.S.C. Therefore, Civil Code section 232.5 does not ap-
pear to have affected Zimmerman's vitality.
However, in 1981 the court in In re Christina L.149 held that a
minor in a parental severance trial had a right to a determination of
whether taking her from the foster parents and placing her with the
natural parents would cause her emotional harm against her best
interests5 00 Thus, there is currently a conflict in the California
courts as to whether evidence of the child/foster parent relationship
is admissible.
The Zimmerman approach is wiser than the Christina L. ap-
proach. First, Christina L. erroneously presumes that the child will
244. Id. at 847, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
245. CAl.. CiV. CODE § 232.5 (West 1982).
246. 93 Cal. App. 3d 14, 22-24, 155 Cal. Rptr. 406, 410-12 (1979).
247. 152 Cal. App. 2d 250, 313 P.2d 52 (1957).
248. 206 Cal. App. 2d at 844, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 335 (quoting In re Melkonian, 152 Cal.
App. 2d at 252, 313 P.2d at 53 (1957)).
249. 118 Cal. App. 3d 737, 173 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1981).
250. Id. at 748, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
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stay with the foster parents and that the foster parents will become
the prospective adoptive parents. However, fewer than 25% of the
foster parents become adoptive parents after parental severance.2" 1
Further, the question of who will become the adoptive parents can
only be determined after parental severance is final.252 If anyone
other than the foster parent is to become the adoptive parent, the
Christina L. rationale evaporates. The minor will not remain in the
foster parents' home, therefore the child/foster parent relationship is
irrelevant to the issue of parental severance. The Christina L. deci-
sion of relevance is based on a presumption derived from speculation;
the court presumes relevance based upon a future likelihood that the
child will remain with the foster parents if he or she is not returned
to the natural parents. The Christina L. presumption is not only
unsound, it violates the express statutory preference for the place-
ment of children with the non-offending parent rather than with a
non-parent. 2 8 Further, since the presumption of continued place-
ment with the foster parents is dependent upon the speculative deter-
minations that both natural parents' rights will be severed and that
the foster parent will become the adoptive parent, it is impossible for
the natural parents to rebut the presumption prior to a trial on the
251. Letter from Bonnie Welch, Special Assistant, Los Angeles County Department of
Children's Services Adoptions Division, to William Patton (Sept. 9, 1986) (on file at the
WCSL Library).
252. Some courts are blindly extending the In re Christina L. case in concluding that
the trial court must act in the child's best interest by admitting all evidence which will aid the
court in determining the best interest of the child. One court stated that any evidence that can
aid the court in "determining how the child's interests can best be served cannot be irrelevant."
Unpublished opinion filed October 31, 1984, at 12-13 (on file at the WCSL Library). Fur-
thermore, Civil Code section 239 provides that if the court severs parental rights, the court
shall either appoint a guardian for the minor or refer the minor to a licensed adoption agency
for adoptive placement by the agency; "however, no petition for adoption may be heard until
the appellate rights of the natural parents have been exhausted." CAL. CIv. CODE § 239
(West 1982).
253. Christina L. also neglects to take into account the preference for custody awards
expressed in Civil Code section 4600. Under section 4600, if one parent is found to be so unfit
as to require a severance of parental ties, the presumption is that the child will remain in the
custody of the non-offending parent: "Custody should be awarded in the following order of
preference according to the best interest of the child: (1) To both parents jointly pursuant to
section 4600.5 or to either parent." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b)(1) (West 1982). In addition,
the Department of Adoptions often argues that foster parents should not be the adoptive par-
ents. "ITIhe agency will argue that any petition for adoption by the foster parents which is
granted by the court will encourage breakdown of the foster parent system by giving it a
permanent placement aspect when it necessarily must remain a temporary care program."
Comment, The Foster Parents Dilemma "Who Can I Turn To When Somebody Needs Me?",
11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 376, 378 (1974). Section 396 provides "[ilt is the policy of the Legisla-
ture that foster care should be a temporary method of care for the children of this state.
CAL. WEL.F. & INST. CODE § 396 (West 1984).
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merits.
Another weakness with the Christina L. approach is that the
parental severance trial can degenerate into a custody battle compar-
ing the environment in the natural parents' home with that in the
foster parents' home rather than addressing the critical question of
the parents' ability to care for the child. In determining which envi-
ronment is best for the child, the natural parents are almost always
at a disadvantage for two reasons. First, a child abuse or neglect
petition has already been sustained against the natural parents. Sec-
ond, the natural parents theoretically represent a cross-section of so-
ciety; they are merely biological parents. However, the foster parents
have been filtered through a state review process to determine
whether they are "fit" to care for the child.2" Therefore, the real
spectre of social engineering is present. The question is whether the
court should or can sever parental rights simply because there is a
better family available who will provide the child a better quality of
life, as defined by the state. That question has been answered several
times; a pure best interests of the child test is against the Legisla-
ture's intent. 255
Dozens of articles have chronicled the horror of Painter v. Ban-
nister'5 6 where the court awarded custody to the grandparent who
had a "stable, dependable, conventional, middle-class, middlewest
background" compared to the father's "unstable, unconventional,
arty, Bohemian, and probably intellectually stimulating" lifestyle.25
The Christina L. approach provides the opportunity for a compara-
tive decision regarding the best interest of the child, as in Painter v.
Bannister. Therefore, the Zimmerman approach appears wiser. If
the court finds that the parents are unfit and that severance is in the
best interests of the child, then the question of child placement can
be addressed in a subsequent hearing to determine the adoptive par-
ent or appropriate guardian.
254. Several articles have chronicled the middle class social worker's inability to ade-
quately determine the fitness of parents from lower socio-economic backgrounds. See Kay and
Phillips, Poverty and the Law of Child Custody, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 717, 737 (1966). Between
60% and 80% of the children in foster care come from families receiving public assistance.
Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423, 432 (1983).
255. In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974); Adoption of
D.S.C., 93 Cal. App. 3d 14, 115 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1979). "The adoption of the detriment to the
child test in Civil Code section 232(a)(7) undoubtedly represents a legislative intention that
parental rights should receive at least as much protection in termination proceedings . . . as in
custody disputes." Comment, Proceedings To Terminate Parental Rights: Too Much or Too
Little Protection for Parents, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 337, 346 (1976).
256. 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152 (1966).
257. Id. at 1393-96, 140 N.W.2d at 154-56.
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Another solution is to bifurcate the issues of parental severance
and placement of the child, which would mirror the bifurcation of
the questions of jurisdiction and placement in dependency cases.
That solution is also consistent with bifurcation in criminal trials of
the guilt and sentencing phases or the guilt and special circumstances
hearing under California Penal Code section 190.1 which requires
that "[tjhe question of the defendant's guilt shall be first deter-
mined."2 8 In criminal trials, if a special circumstance is alleged to
support the death penalty, the proceeding will be further bifurcated
if the special circumstance alleges that the defendant has been con-
victed of a prior offense of "murder in the first or second degree."
Mere bifurcation of the guilt and punishment phases in death pen-
alty cases is not sufficient to protect the defendant from the prejudi-
cial impact of statutorily relevant evidence on the prior murder al-
leged as a special circumstance. Further, in People v. Hall25" the
court recognized that introduction of relevant prior felony conviction
evidence, as an element of the charged offense, may be prejudicial to
a defendant who admits that element. The court suggested a bifurca-
tion of the trial on the elements of the charged offense. The court
noted that the verdict forms should reflect that the defendant is or is
not guilty as charged in the accusatory pleading of violating Penal
Code section 12021 (prior felon in possession of firearms) without
referring to the prior conviction. 0 The California courts and Legis-
lature have recognized that when the fundamental rights of liberty or
life are implicated, due process sometimes requires that highly rele-
vant, probative data be excluded from the determination of guilt.
That data is later admissible in the bifurcated proceeding if guilt is
found.
Similarly, bifurcating the parental severance issue of the par-
ents' fitness to rear the child from the question of placement or best
interest of the child, permits the court to consider the minor's current
foster home placement only if there has been a prior determination
of parental unfitness. The Painter v. Bannister normative infection
simply would not occur, yet all best interest of the child placement
evidence could be later introduced to help the court determine the
best future for the child. Thus, the child's right to introduce that
evidence pursuant to Christina L. would be preserved.
However, the recent decision in In re Connie M. 26 ' has mud-
258. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West Supp. 1987).
259. 28 Cal. 3d 143, 616 P.2d 526, 167 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1980).
260. Id. at 155 n.7, 616 P.2d at 832 n.7, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 851 n.7.
261. 176 Cal. App. 3d 1225, 222 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1986).
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died the Zimmerman lChristina L. debate."" In Connie M., the
court ruled that foster parents had standing in parental severance
trials, analogizing to In re B.G."6 s But that analogy is inapt and
pernicious. First, in In re B.G. the sole issue at the disposition hear-
ing was the best temporary placement for the minor. The county had
already sustained its burden at the jurisdictional hearing demonstrat-
ing that the parents had abused and neglected the child. Therefore,
there was no threat of a Painter v. Bannister normative bias in the
initial determination whether the alleged parental abuse occurred.
However, in a parental severance trial, evidence of the relative mer-
its of alternative child placement necessarily affects the judge's view
of whether the natural parents are fit to care for their child. There-
fore, after In re Connie M., bifurcation of the issues of parental fit-
ness and the best interest of the child placement is even more
critical.2 6
4
In re Connie M. also comes to the erroneous and facile conclu-
sion that granting foster parents standing in parental severance trials
promotes "judicial economy." The court's theory is that if both
natural parents are determined incapable of rearing the minor, the
Legislature has provided a preference that custody be awarded to
"the person or persons in whose home the child has been living in a
wholesome and stable environment. ' '..5 However, the court's conclu-
sion of judicial economy is illusory. True, a formal petition for
262. Id. at 1232-33, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
263. Id. at 1233, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 677-78; In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244,
114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
264. The In re B.G. court expressly reserved the question of whether due process and
equal protection require that the foster parents receive notice, an opportunity to be heard, and
counsel in dependency trials pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. 11 Cal. 3d
at 693 n.21, 523 P.2d at 253-54 n.21, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 453-54 n.21. Historically, such rights
have not existed under the U.S. Constitution because foster parents have no liberty or property
interest in the child.
True liberty rights do not flow from state laws, which can be repealed by action
of the legislature. . .. . The very fact that the relationship before us is a crea-
ture of state law . . . demonstrates that it is not a protected liberty interest, but
an interest limited by the very laws which create it.
Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children Serv., 563 F.2d 1200, 1207 (5th
Cir. 1977); accord Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1985). If foster parents
have standing and the full panoply of due process trial rights, the central focus of parental
severance trials will shift from the natural parents' fitness to a custody battle focusing on the
relative placements for the minor. See also In re Christina K., 184 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 229
Cal. Rptr. 247 (1986) (In a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366 status review hearing
the appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in not granting foster parents standing.
However, the factual determination of parental neglect had already been determined at an
earlier jurisdiction hearing).
265. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West 1983).
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guardianship will be avoided if the status of guardian is not required
for foster parent standing. However, that hearing will merely be re-
placed by a parental severance pre-trial hearing to determine
whether the foster parents meet the requirements under Civil Code
section 4600 which has the conjunctive requirements that: (1) the
child has been living with the foster parents; and (2) there has been
"a wholesome and stable environment" in the foster parents' home.
The In re Connie M. court never discussed the need to determine
whether the Civil Code section 4600 criteria existed; the court pre-
sumed the requirements were met.' 66 The natural parents will
surely wish to contest the foster parents' standing.2 7 However, the
natural parents will be forced into a tactical quagmire. If they do not
object to the foster parents' standing, the question of the relative
merits of alternative custody awards will be litigated together with
the issue of the natural parents' fitness. If the natural parents do
object to the foster parents' standing, the quality of the foster care
placement will greatly influence the court even before the parental
severance trial begins. There is, of course, an easy remedy. A differ-
ent judge should hear all pre-trial motions, in effect, creating a law
and motion court for child dependency and parental severance
actions. In order to assure just and accurate decisions, the issue of
266. It is unrealistic to assume that the environment in foster placement is "wholesome"
merely because sometime in the past the social worker concluded that the foster home met
minimal placement standards. Review of foster home placement is almost non-existent. "The
catch now is that children's services is stretched so thin that it might not make contact for
months with that half of reported cases that it does accept." L. Timnick, Child Abuse a Grow-
ing Tragedy in L.A. County, L.A. Times, August 21, 1983, at 32, col. __. It is unrealistic to
believe that a children's worker with caseloads sometimes exceeding 100 families can truly
monitor each case closely enough to chart changes in the custody environment. Children's
Services, supra note 7, at A3, col. 5. More cases are beginning to question the perfunctory
efforts of case workers to monitor and assist families thrust into the dependency system. See In
re Terry E., 180 Cal. App. 3d 932, 225 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1986).
267. Under Civil Code section 387, the intervenor has the burden of demonstrating that
standing is necessary. People v. Brophy, 49 Cal. App. 2d 15, 120 P.2d 946 (1942). Further,
objection to the lack of a party's standing to appear in an action may be made by a general
demurrer. Timberidge Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa, 86 Cal. App. 3d 873, 880, 150
Cal. Rptr. 606, 610 (1978). In contrast, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 24, where
a governmental body is suing as parents patriae, "a strong affirmative showing that the sover-
eign is not fairly representing the interests of the [intervening] applicant" must be demon-
strated. U.S. v. Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp., 101 F.R.D. 451 (W.D.N.Y.), aff d, 749
F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984). Since the county is representing the child's interest in a Civil Code
section 232 trial, the foster parents should be required to demonstrate that the county will not
adequately represent the foster parents' interest, before the court determines that the foster
parents have standing. Otherwise, section 232 trials will be needlessly lengthened, and the In
re Connie M. rationale of judicial economy will be eviscerated. The county can marshall the
relevant facts concerning foster parents by calling them as witnesses during its case-in-chief.
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parental fitness must be separated from the issue of the relative mer-
its of alternative placements.
V. CONCLUSION
This article rests upon a few basic assumptions. Foremost is the
policy of dependency court intervention into family life only when it
is necessary to protect children. That process of court involvement
must provide quick, fair and accurate determinations regarding pa-
rental fitness and the best interests of children. Under the current
law the dependency system provides parents disincentives to cooper-
ate with the court and child protective services. Statements made to
social workers, therapists and prosecutors can be used against the
parents in subsequent civil and criminal proceedings. The parents'
benefits of plea negotiation are illusory since stricken facts and alle-
gations can be considered in future proceedings. The system thus
discourages quick resolution of family problems. The article's sug-
gestions of extending parents' privilege against self-incrimination
and use and derivative immunity will provide an incentive for parent
co-operation. The court will be able to more readily determine
whether intervention is necessary and what family reunification ser-
vices are needed.
In order to assure fair and accurate hearings, a few simple
changes need to be made. First, the unmanageable social worker case
loads must be reduced in order to assure that probation reports are
complete and accurate, and that family reunification progress can be
adequately monitored. Further, all parents who cannot afford coun-
sel should be guaranteed a court-appointed attorney as a due process
right. It is not in the best interests of children to separate them from
their parents based upon trials where critical facts are not mar-
shalled, where inadmissible evidence is not objected to and where the
parents lack the professional training to make reasoned choices
among the myriad of legal alternatives available.
Finally, the parameters of admissible evidence applicable to
criminal and juvenile delinquency trials should be formally applied
to child dependency and parental severance cases. The policies of
fairness and justice underlying the century of evidentiary develop-
ments in criminal and juvenile delinquency trials are equally
applicable to child abuse and neglect cases. A law and motion court
is needed for parents to raise pre-trial motions concerning the scope
of data prior to the trial judge reading the probation report. It is not
in the childrens', parents', or state's best interest to permit the court
to read inadmissible evidence regarding raw arrest data, uncharged
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allegations, legally insufficient facts, or to prematurely consider evi-
dence of the minor's adjustment in foster placement. Many of these
suggestions do not require new funding for implementation.
However, the changes will benefit our children and provide more
accuracy and fairness to the process which will decide whether fami-
lies will forever be torn asunder.
